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NOTES
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(1)’S
“SIMILAR MOTIVE” TEST AND THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Brandon Berkowski*
This Note examines the “similar motive” test of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1) as applied to grand jury testimony offered against the
government. Rule 804(b)(1) admits an unavailable witness’s prior
testimony hearsay when its opponent had a “motive” to develop it at the
previous proceeding that was “similar” to the motive its opponent would
have at trial. However, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have differed in their
interpretation of the rule’s “similar motive” language with respect to the
factors that judges should consider in the admissibility analysis for grand
jury testimony offered against the government. This Note examines the
development and purpose of the prior testimony hearsay exception as well
as recent circuit court cases that have applied Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury
testimony offered against the government. It argues that certain factors
commonly considered by courts—primarily prosecutors’ strategic use of
grand jury questioning—are beyond the scope of Rule 804(b)(1) and should
not influence the “similar motive” inquiry. This Note proposes an
admissibility test for exculpatory grand jury testimony that avoids
consideration of these factors.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) is a hearsay exception governing the
admissibility of an unavailable witness’s testimony from a prior
proceeding.1 The reliability of prior testimony and the fairness of
introducing it against a party depend primarily on whether the opposing
party had a chance at the prior proceeding to question the witness about the
issues now relevant at trial.2 According to the rule, prior testimony is not
admissible unless the party against whom it is offered had “an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.”3 Although this language clearly expresses the root purpose
of the exception—to protect a party from the admission of a witness’s past
testimony unless the party had a meaningful chance to question the witness
at the prior proceeding4—it has proved to be a challenging test for courts to
apply.5
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals have split in their application of Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury
testimony that the defendant offers against the government in a criminal
trial.6 The factual circumstances underlying the split typically arise under

1. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
2. See id. advisory committee’s note (equating direct and redirect examination with
cross-examination for the purpose of this exception and explaining that fairness prohibits the
introduction of prior testimony against a party who did not examine the declarant);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (reasoning that prior testimony that was
subject to cross-examination was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial); JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL ¶ 14.01[01][c] (1987)
(explaining the importance of adversarial examination in assuring the credibility of a
witness’s testimony).
3. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
4. See 4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 804.02[4] (9th ed. 2006) (“The similar motive inquiry is essentially a hypothetical one: is
the motive to develop the testimony at the prior time similar to the motive that would exist if
the declarant were produced (which of course he is not) at the current trial or hearing?”);
Michael M. Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547, 557 (1972) (“In determining whether the prior examination
was adequate to protect the interest of the opponent in the present case, the only question . . .
is whether the examiner had ‘motive and interest [for developing the testimony] similar to
those of the party against whom now offered.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Rule
804(b)(1) as originally promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, discussed infra at note 100
and accompanying text)).
5. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 304, at 355–56 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006) (explaining that “the Circuits appear divided as to whether in typical grand jury
situations exculpatory testimony meets this [‘similar motive’] requirement of the Rule”);
Martin, supra note 4, at 557 (explaining that the common law formulation of the exception
was easier to apply than the Federal Rule, in part because the Rules’ drafters provided no
criteria to guide judges in its application).
6. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355 (describing this split); see also infra
Part II.
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The government conducts a grand jury
similar circumstances.7
investigation seeking the indictment of one or more suspects.8 At some
point during the investigation, either before or after an indictment is
returned, the prosecution calls a witness who offers testimony favorable to a
suspect.9 At trial, the defense subpoenas this grand jury witness, but the
witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and refuses to testify.10 The government, which may have obtained the
witness’s prior testimony by granting the witness immunity at the grand
jury proceeding, refuses to grant immunity at trial.11 The defense then
seeks to introduce the witness’s exculpatory grand jury testimony pursuant
to Rule 804(b)(1), and the court must decide whether the prosecution’s
motive for challenging the testimony at the grand jury was similar to the
motive it would have if the witness appeared at trial.12
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and First Circuits have
construed the rule’s “similar motive” requirement narrowly in the grand
jury context and issued decisions suggesting that exculpatory grand jury
testimony would rarely be admissible against the government.13 By
contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have compared the prosecution’s respective motives “at a
high level of generality”14 and issued decisions suggesting that exculpatory
grand jury testimony is almost always admissible against the government
because the prosecution’s “motive” at both proceedings is simply to
challenge any testimony adverse to its theory of the case.15
In evidentiary terms, Rule 804(b)(1) balances fairness to litigants with
the fact-finders’ need for information by admitting prior testimony hearsay
that meets a certain standard of reliability.16 The rule does not promote a
general policy favoring either the government or the defendant in criminal
proceedings; and, this Note argues, courts’ admissibility analyses under the
rule’s “similar motive” test should not consider the strategic use of
questioning common to grand jury examinations.17 In each decision
contributing to the circuit split that is the subject of this Note, the court
reached its conclusion based on analysis of a common set of factors.18 This
7. The facts of United States v. DiNapoli, a case against several defendants accused of
participating in a construction bid-rigging scheme, are illustrative. 8 F.3d 909, 910 (2d Cir.
1993). See also infra Part II.A.1.
8. See, e.g., DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910.
9. See, e.g., id. at 910–11 (describing the grand jury proceeding of two witnesses who
testified favorably to the defendants after indictments were returned).
10. See, e.g., id. at 911.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S.
317 (1992).
12. See, e.g., DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911–12; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
13. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at
914–15.
14. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2009).
15. See id. at 963; United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
16. See infra Part I.C.1.
17. See infra Part III.B; see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part III.A.3.
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Note examines the circuit court cases, paying special attention to the factors
on which the courts based their decisions, and argues that some of those
factors are beyond the scope of Rule 804(b)(1) and should not be
considered in the “similar motive” analysis. This Note then proposes an
admissibility test for grand jury testimony offered against the government
that avoids the impermissible factors.
Part I.A–C examines the development of the prior testimony hearsay
exception from the common law through its codification in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, paying special attention to the purposes the rule is meant
to serve in contemporary evidence law. Part I.D examines the application
of Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury testimony offered against the government.
This part highlights the difficulty courts face in interpreting the rule’s
“similar motive” language by showing how its application to the same
factors—in different contexts—has led to opposing admissibility holdings.
Part II discusses the principal cases where courts have applied Rule
804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test to grand jury testimony offered against the
government, emphasizing the particular factors that influenced each court’s
decision. Part III analyzes the two groups of cases contributing to the
circuit split, as well as the factors upon which the courts based their
admissibility decisions, in light of Rule 804(b)(1)’s evidentiary purposes.
This Part argues that certain factors the courts considered do not affect the
motive to develop testimony and thus have no legitimate place in the Rule
804(b)(1) analysis. Finally, Part III.B proposes an objective “similar
motive” test designed to meet the evidentiary purposes of Rule 804(b)(1)
while avoiding the impermissible factors.
This Note concludes that courts should find “similar motive” and admit
grand jury testimony against the government only where a reasonable
prosecutor, proceeding as if the witness were testifying at trial, would have
had a motive to discredit the witness’s grand jury testimony. In other
words, considering the scope of the investigation and the information
available to the prosecution at the time of questioning, the court should
admit exculpatory grand jury testimony if a reasonable prosecutor would
have had a motive to challenge the testimony on the issues now relevant at
trial, regardless of whether the prosecution failed to raise such a challenge
for strategic reasons or otherwise.
I. THE PRIOR TESTIMONY HEARSAY EXCEPTION AND GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS
The hearsay exception for prior testimony has a long history in the
common law prior to its codification as Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1).19 Part I.A discusses the general prohibition against hearsay
evidence and places the exception for prior testimony in context with the
other hearsay exceptions. Part I.B explains the historical justification for
admitting prior testimony and discusses the requirements for admissibility.
Part I.C discusses the competing evidentiary concerns that are balanced by
19. See infra Part I.C.
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the prior testimony hearsay exception and how that balance has shifted from
the common law to the exception’s codification in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Finally, Part I.D explains the “opportunity” and “similar motive”
elements of Rule 804(b)(1) and compares the application of the rule to
grand jury and preliminary hearing testimony. This comparison highlights
the manipulability of the rule’s “similar motive” language and lays the
foundation for Part II’s examination of the circuit split in grand jury
testimony admissibility decisions.
A. The Hearsay Prohibition and Its Exceptions
The reliability of any witness’s testimony depends on the quality of the
witness’s perception, memory, and narration, and the degree to which the
witness testifies with sincerity.20 The American legal system enables
evaluation of these characteristics of witness testimony by requiring that
testimony be (1) delivered under oath, (2) delivered in the presence of the
fact-finder, and (3) subject to examination by its proponent and immediate
cross-examination by its opponent.21 When a statement is made without the
benefit of any one of these conditions, its reliability is subject to question
and it is inadmissible hearsay.22 Hearsay statements that are not covered by
an exception to the general prohibition are also inadmissible out of concern
for fairness to litigants.23 The American legal system relies on the principle
that evidence should not be admitted against a party unless that party has—
or, in the case of prior testimony, has had—a chance to rebut it.24 Because
most hearsay was not subject to examination by the party against whom it is
offered at trial, fairness dictates that it should be inadmissible.25
Formalistic guarantees of reliability and fairness aside, the law of evidence
generally seeks to admit evidence that is potentially probative, especially
when exclusion might result in injustice.26 This is especially true when the
evidence under consideration offers other assurances that it is trustworthy27
or that it would be fair to admit it against a litigant.28 Hence, there exist
20. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note.
21. See id.
22. See Martin, supra note 4, at 550.
23. See Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Study in
Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REV. 295, 301
(1989).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“Common sense tells that
much evidence which is not given under the three conditions may be inherently superior to
much that is. Moreover, when the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without.
The problem thus resolves itself into effecting a sensible accommodation between these
considerations and the desirability of giving testimony under the ideal conditions.”); 2
SPENCER A. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 8:9, at 179 (6th ed. 1972);
Martin, supra note 4, at 550.
27. See Martin, supra note 4, at 550.
28. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining that fairness
concerns are not implicated in the admission of prior testimony that has been sufficiently
cross-examined by the party opposing it).
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many exceptions to the general prohibition against the admission of hearsay
for various classes of evidence;29 and some types of evidence that would
otherwise be considered hearsay are entirely omitted from the definition.30
The Federal Rules of Evidence have divided admissible hearsay into two
broad categories, “one dealing with situations where availability [at trial] of
the declarant is regarded as immaterial and the other with those where
unavailability is made a condition to the admission of the hearsay
statement.”31
The exceptions codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803, where
availability of the declarant is immaterial, admit classes of hearsay with the
shared characteristic that the circumstances surrounding the statements
guarantee their trustworthiness sufficiently to overcome concerns about lack
of oath, personal presence, or immediate cross-examination.32 In other
words, the hearsay evidence admissible under this rule may be the best
evidence available, and there is a perceived need for it at trial, so it is
admissible without regard for whether the declarant could be produced to
testify on the same subject under the three conditions for reliability.33 The
exceptions codified in Rule 804, however, govern evidence that is not the
best that could ideally be obtained.34 Nonetheless, it is admissible because
(1) the declarant is no longer available and (2) the conditions under which
the hearsay was obtained generated enough circumstantial guarantees of its
trustworthiness that its probative value is not outweighed by its lack of

29. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“The solution evolved by the
common law has been a general rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous exceptions
under circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness.”). For the types of
hearsay evidence admissible because they offer other circumstantial guarantees of reliability,
see FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
30. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (“Statements Which Are Not Hearsay”). One example of a
type of evidence excluded from the hearsay definition is a statement by a party-opponent that
is admissible against that party as its own statement, despite its having been made under
circumstances lacking the guarantees of reliability. Such a statement is clearly hearsay under
the definition in FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c), but, according to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), it is
excluded from the definition.
31. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (referring to FED. R. EVID. 803
(“Availability of Declarant Immaterial”), 804 (“Declarant Unavailable”)).
32. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (“The present rule proceeds upon
the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the
declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available.”).
33. See id. An example of this type of evidence is the “excited utterance,” which is “[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Hearsay
statements of this type are admissible on the theory that the circumstances of their utterance
“may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection
and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.” FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee’s note. They are spontaneous and therefore do not implicate the testimonial
capacities of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity to the same degree as nonspontaneous types of hearsay. The reliability of these statements would thus not be
improved by delivery under the conditions of oath, personal presence, or immediate crossexamination. See id.
34. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note.
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conformity with the three conditions for reliability.35 According to the
advisory committee, “[Rule 804] expresses preferences: testimony given
on the stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the
specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the
declarant.”36 Prior testimony is among the types of hearsay classified under
Rule 804.37
B. The Admissibility of Prior Testimony Hearsay
Prior testimony hearsay is a second-best type of evidence that would not
be admissible if the witness were available to testify in person.38 Of the
three guarantees of testimonial reliability, prior testimony hearsay only
lacks the second: it was not delivered in open court in the presence of the
fact-finder and the adversary.39 The declarant was under oath at the prior
proceeding, however, and was subject to immediate cross-examination or
its equivalent.40 Historically, delivering testimony in the personal presence
35. See, e.g., Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay
from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1106–07 (1987). Explaining the
rationale behind Rule 804(b)(2)’s admission of “dying declarations,” Professor
Weissenberger states:
The exception for deathbed statements . . . originally derived its assumed
guarantee of trustworthiness from the religious belief that a dying person would
not meet his maker with a lie on his lips. In the more secular world, however, this
rationale for the exception has largely been supplanted by the theory that the
powerful psychological forces bearing on the declarant at the moment of death
engender a compulsion to speak truthfully.
Id. (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). There is thus no need for such
testimony to have been delivered under oath, in the personal presence of the fact-finder, and
subject to immediate cross-examination. If the deathbed declarant were still “available” to
testify, however, the declarant’s live testimony on the same matter would be preferred. See
FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note; see also Jack R. Jelsema et al., Comment,
Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
1077, 1102 (1969) (“The theory underlying the . . . category of exceptions, which requires
the declarant to be unavailable as a witness, is that although it would be preferable to have
the declarant testify as a witness, if he is unavailable there is sufficient circumstantial
assurance of accuracy so that it is better to receive the statement in evidence than to do
completely without it.”).
36. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note.
37. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
38. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394–95 (1986) (“[F]ormer testimony often is
only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has independent evidentiary
significance of its own, but is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is available
and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony,
with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there
is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same
evidence are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay . . . favor the better
evidence. But if the declarant is unavailable, no ‘better’ version of the evidence exists, and
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live testimony on the same point.”
(citation omitted)).
39. Martin, supra note 4, at 550–51.
40. See id.; 2 H. C. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 420
(Philip F. Herrick ed., 5th ed. 1973); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s
note (explaining that direct and redirect examination of one’s own witness are the equivalent
of cross-examination for the purposes of the rule). Whether the questioning that took place
at the prior proceeding actually satisfies the reliability requirement of cross-examination is
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of the fact-finder has been important because the demeanor of the witness,
in addition to the recorded evidence of what the witness says, offers
“valuable clues” to the fact-finder.41 Also, “the solemnity of the occasion
and the possibility of public disgrace” created a disincentive for witnesses
to offer false testimony.42 Today, however, the importance of these
guarantees of testimonial trustworthiness is eclipsed by cross-examination’s
role in ensuring reliability.43 Dean John Henry Wigmore has called crossexamination “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth.”44 Given that prior testimony has theoretically been subject to crossexamination (or to direct or redirect examination)45 by a party with interests
similar to those of the party against whom it is admitted, it has been argued
that “former testimony is the strongest hearsay” and that it should be
admissible regardless of whether the declarant is available.46 Some
commentators have even argued that prior testimony is not hearsay at all.47
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not endorse this position
but nevertheless accepted the common law understanding that prior
testimony satisfies the primary evidentiary concerns of fairness and
reliability and should therefore be admissible under an exception to the
Rules’ general prohibition against hearsay.48
central to this Note’s discussion. But, for general purposes, and as distinguished from other
types of admissible hearsay, prior testimony that is admitted has met the reliability
requirement of immediate cross-examination. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s
note.
41. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (citing Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495–96 (1951)).
42. Id. In the case of prior testimony, this last function of impressing the witness with
solemnity is still met because, even though the witness is not present at trial, the witness
nonetheless delivered testimony in the course of a formal proceeding. See FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(1) (admitting prior testimony only when “given as a witness at another hearing . . . or
in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of . . . [a] proceeding”).
43. See 2 GARD, supra note 26, § 9:25; Martin, supra note 4, at 553–54 (“Given the faith
which the Anglo-American adversary system places in the efficacy of cross-examination, it
is not surprising that the most important feature of the former-testimony exception is that
which requires such testimony to have been given in a situation where an opportunity existed
to utilize that truth-testing device.”); Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 301 n.30 (“‘[T]he
[Anglo-American] belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is
comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement . . .
should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test’ forms the
basis for the norm that probative evidence should be rejected if it cannot be rebutted by the
adverse party.” (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974))).
44. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974).
45. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
46. Id. advisory committee’s note.
47. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1370; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 296
n.6 (listing commentators who disagree whether prior testimony should be characterized as
hearsay).
48. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (explaining the common law
basis for the hearsay exceptions codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence); 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 44, § 1422 (explaining that certain hearsay evidence may be accepted untested
because its trustworthiness is circumstantially guaranteed); Weissenberger, supra note 35, at
1095 (noting that “[t]he common law exception to the hearsay rule codified in Rule
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Unavailability of the witness is also an important requirement for
statements to be admissible under the prior testimony hearsay exception.49
“Unavailability” includes situations in which the declarant (1) is exempted
from testifying on the ground of privilege, (2) refuses to testify despite
being ordered by the court to do so, (3) testifies to a lack of memory
concerning the prior testimony, (4) is unable to testify because of physical
or mental illness or death, or (5) is absent and unable to be procured by the
party seeking to offer the testimony.50 A declarant is not “unavailable” if
the proponent of the testimony in any way procured the declarant’s
unavailability.51 Under certain circumstances, as discussed below, a
witness’s unavailability in criminal cases is due to the witness’s claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination and the prosecution’s refusal to
grant immunity.52 The government’s refusal to immunize a witness under
these circumstances is not considered “procurement” of the witness’s
unavailability under Rule 804(b)(1).53
C. The Development of the Prior Testimony Hearsay Exception from the
Common Law to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
The prior testimony hearsay exception balances the competing
evidentiary concerns of fairness to litigants and the necessity of information
for fact-finders.54 Although the purpose of the exception has remained
consistent throughout its history, the balance between these concerns has
not.55 This section explains that the exception is rooted in a desire to
promote strict fairness to litigants. Over time, however, the exception’s
requirements were relaxed to allow more prior testimony to be admitted;
when the exception was codified as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the drafters were conscious to write a rule that more evenly balanced
concerns for fairness with concerns for necessity.
1. Fairness, Necessity, and the Adversarial System
A tension exists in the law of evidence between the desire to provide
fact-finders with the greatest amount of information available—to increase
the accuracy of decisions rendered—and the desire to exclude otherwise

804(b)(1) is justified by the traditional policies of necessity and trustworthiness,” and that
trustworthiness, like adversarial fairness, is a function of cross-examination).
49. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394–95 (1986).
50. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)–(5).
51. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S.
317 (1992).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he law
appears to be well settled that the power of the Executive Branch to grant immunity to a
witness is discretionary and no obligation exists on the part of the United States Attorney to
seek such immunity.”); see also Daniel J. Capra, ‘Salerno,’ Plain Meaning and the Supreme
Court, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1992, at 3.
54. See infra Part I.C.1.
55. See infra Part I.C.2.
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relevant information when its admission would be unfair to litigants.56 In
the United States, evidence law generally developed with an emphasis on
fairness to litigants.57 This development could be expected, given the
adversarial character of America’s legal system.58 Truth is said to emerge
from the contest between parties, each advocating strenuously for its own
cause, with the advocacy of each kept in check by a neutral judge who
interprets the law and enforces procedural rules to ensure that the contest is
fair.59 The hearsay exception admitting prior testimony, as part of this
larger body of evidence law, also developed with an early emphasis on
fairness to litigants.60
2. Prior Testimony Hearsay at Common Law
The admissibility inquiry for prior testimony at common law was
concerned with “whether the examination of the witness at the prior
proceeding was substantially similar to that which would have occurred at
the current proceeding if the witness had testified.”61 No prior testimony
would be admitted against a party unless the development of that testimony
at the previous proceeding could be fairly attributed to the party opposing
it.62 To determine whether this standard had been met, common law courts
examined the “identity of parties” and the “identity of issues” at the two
proceedings.63
Initially, prior testimony was not admissible unless the parties and issues
were exactly the same at both proceedings.64 This early approach
guaranteed a high degree of fairness to litigants,65 but it often proved too
56. See Lloyd v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)] was originally designed by the Advisory Committee . . . to strike a proper
balance between the recognized risk of introducing testimony of one not physically present
on a witness stand and the equally recognized risk of denying to the fact-finder important
relevant evidence.”); Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 297–98 (discussing “fairness” versus
“accuracy” in the context of different policy approaches to the admission of evidence and
explaining the connection between availability of information to fact-finders and their ability
to render decisions).
57. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 302.
58. See id. at 297 n.13.
59. See id. By contrast, in civil law countries that use an inquisitorial system, truth can
be said to emerge from an authority’s independent investigation into the facts of the case,
and accuracy—rather than fairness—is a more pressing concern of evidentiary law. See id. at
nn.12–13, 300–03.
60. See id. at 302 (noting that “the earliest evidentiary rules developed in response to
concerns for adversarial fairness” and also citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394–
95 (1986)).
61. Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1099.
62. See FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI
PRIUS 239 (New York, I. Riley & Co. 1806) (“[I]t is against natural justice that a man should
be concluded by proofs in a cause to which he was not a party.”); 5 WIGMORE, supra note
44, § 1386; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 307–08.
63. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note; Weissenberger, supra note 35, at
1099.
64. Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 306–07.
65. The “mutuality” requirement respecting both parties, for instance, ensured that no
party could benefit by offering testimony against the other which could not also be offered
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restrictive for fact-finders because it excluded a great deal of evidence that
became inadmissible as a result of the declarants’ unavailability.66 To
address this “necessity” concern and allow a greater balance of prior
testimony to be admitted, common law courts developed qualifications to
the same-parties requirement and less restrictive standards concerning the
similarity of issues.67
The first qualification loosened the identity of parties requirement to
allow prior testimony to be admitted against the party that developed it,
regardless of the identity of the other party at the two proceedings.68 The
requirement was then further relaxed to admit testimony against a party that
was developed not by that party, but by its predecessor.69 Courts engrafted
privity requirements from property law onto the “identity of parties” inquiry
and required privity in “blood, law, or estate”70 to ensure some basis for
binding a party to testimony it did not itself develop.71
Over time, common law courts also shifted to demand not precise but
merely “substantial” “identity of issues” between prior and subsequent
proceedings.72 As one leading treatise explains, insistence upon the issues
being precisely identical is more fitting if the question is one of estoppel or
res judicata—in other words, of the fairness of binding a party.73 But where
necessity concerns take precedence, and “the question is not of binding
anyone but merely of salvaging the testimony,” insistence upon precise
identity of issues is out of place.74

against itself. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 804.04[5], at 804-47 (1997).
66. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, §§ 1420–21 (explaining, generally, the relationship
between the principle of “necessity” and the admissibility of hearsay evidence); Martin,
supra note 4, at 555.
67. See Martin, supra note 4, at 555; see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354
(“The requirement has become, not a mechanical one of identity or even of substantial
identity of issues, but rather that the issues in the first proceeding, and hence the purpose for
which the testimony was offered, must have been such as to produce an adequate motive for
testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony.”).
68. Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 307. This relaxation of the original requirement
that both parties be the same at both proceedings was justified on the simple theory that “it
appeared fair to estop . . . a party from objecting to evidence developed by that party.” Id.
69. Id.
70. Martin, supra note 4, at 555.
71. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 308. This expansion was justified on the
theory that “[i]t did not appear unfair to hold a party responsible for a previous litigant’s
examination or cross-examination of a witness when the party against whom the prior
testimony was offered had succeeded to the position of the predecessor litigant conducting
the examination or cross-examination in the prior action,” and, as the party’s successor,
“stood in the place of the predecessor and succeeded to all of the benefits and liabilities of
that interest.” Id.
72. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 353 (citing several cases); 3 CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 650, at 375–76 (13th ed. 1973) (citing several
cases).
73. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 353.
74. Id.; see also In re White’s Will, 141 N.E.2d 416, 418 (N.Y. 1957) (admitting prior
testimony concerning capacity to manage affairs in a later proceeding concerning
competency to make a will).
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In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the focus of evidence law, as
reflected in evidentiary rules, shifted from ensuring fairness to litigants to
encouraging accuracy of information.75 The formalistic “identity of
parties” inquiry—engrafted with property-law concepts of privity—was
criticized, and it was recognized that prior testimony could meet fairness
requirements and provide necessary information to fact-finders without
adhering to the restrictive “identity of parties” test.76 Dean Wigmore
ensured that courts would eventually adopt a more liberal version of the
rule when he famously explained how a concern with the parties’
“interests” could justify a departure from strict privity requirements.77 In
1899, he wrote:
[A]ll that is essential is that the present opponent should have had a fair
opportunity of cross-examination; consequently, a change of parties
which does not effect such a loss does not prevent the use of the
testimony . . . and the principle also admits the testimony where the
parties, though not the same, are so privy in interest . . . that the same
motive and need for cross-examination existed.78

Rather than rely on a privity relationship between parties, Dean Wigmore
recognized the importance of inquiring into each party’s “interest” in
developing prior testimony through cross-examination as the key to
ensuring testimonial reliability and adversarial fairness.79 Thus, Dean
Wigmore articulated the general shift in evidence law from fairness to
necessity and refocused attention from the identity of parties and issues to
the underlying “motive” for developing testimony, which encompasses
both.80 Since then, according to McCormick’s treatise, the inquiry has
75. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 309; see also supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
76. See Martin, supra note 4, at 555–56; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 309–10.
Employing a hypothetical where two parties individually sue an airline after an accident that
injured them both, Professor Judson F. Falknor demonstrates how a fairness argument based
on concern for privity of relationship between the parties would exclude one party from
using otherwise relevant testimony developed in the other’s trial. See Judson F. Falknor,
Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Comment, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651, 654–55
(1963). But, Professor Falknor argues, if the concern was not with privity but strictly with
the “interest and motive” that the two parties might individually have had to examine the
witness, then the “social interest in achieving a just and correct result” would favor a rule
that admits the testimony because the two parties, from the perspective of the testimony
itself, had the same “interest and motive” to develop it. See id. at 655.
77. See Martin, supra note 4, at 556; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 309–10.
78. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 163a, at 278–79 (John
Henry Wigmore rev., 16th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1899) (emphasis added).
79. See Martin, supra note 4, at 555–56.
80. See id. at 556 (“While old ways died hard, the courts gradually progressed away
from the requirement of literal identity of parties and issues toward a consideration of the
reliability of the testimony in light of the circumstances. Accordingly, increasing attention
was given to two related issues: (1) Whether the opponent’s interest was represented in the
first hearing, rather than whether there was identity of parties or privies on both sides, and
(2) whether the issues in the two hearings were similar to the extent that the opponent in the
first examination had a motive and interest to develop the testimony similar to those which
the present opponent would have if he were cross-examining.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining the connection between
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become whether “the issues in the first proceeding, and hence the purpose
for which the testimony was offered, [were] such as to produce an adequate
motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony.”81
Notably, the common law admissibility inquiry for prior testimony, while
concerned with the parties involved in proceedings and the issues
adjudicated at those proceedings, did not consider the type of proceeding at
which the prior testimony was developed as part of the inquiry.82 The focus
was first on the identity of parties and issues and later on the parties’
“interests” or “motivations.”83 But the prior proceeding’s type provided
nothing independently to the admissibility inquiry.84
3. The Codification of the Prior Testimony Hearsay Exception
a. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence grew out of an effort initiated by U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, who, in 1965, appointed an
advisory committee to draft uniform rules of evidence for use in the federal
This committee, composed of judges, practitioners, and
courts.85
academics, drew from the common law of evidence as well as the Model
Code of Evidence (promulgated in 1942) and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence (promulgated in 1953).86 In 1972, the advisory committee
delivered its completed rules to the Supreme Court, which transmitted them
to the Congress the following year under the Rules Enabling Act.87 The
Rules would have become effective on July 1, 1973, but for a bill requiring
Congress to affirmatively approve them.88 Both the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees scrutinized the proposed rules, and, after many
amendments, Congress finally enacted them in 1975.89
In their treatment of hearsay, the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate
the liberalizations in admissibility that developed over time at the common
law.90 When confronting the problem of how to handle hearsay under the
motive and interest to cross-examine at prior and current proceedings and “identity of
issues”).
81. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354.
82. See 2 BURR W. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 311 (Spencer
A. Gard rev., 5th ed. 1958); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354.
83. See supra notes 64–81 and accompanying text.
84. See 2 JONES, supra note 82, § 311; 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354; see
also Martin, supra note 4, at 552 (“Federal Rule [804(b)(1)] places emphasis on the
testimony itself, with the nature of the prior hearing being unimportant except to the extent
that any such prior hearing did not present an opportunity for cross-examination equivalent
to cross-examination in the present proceeding.”).
85. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 3 (2d ed. 2008).
86. Id.
87. Id.; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312.
88. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9; Weissenberger, supra note 23,
at 312.
89. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 295, 312–16.
90. See David Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Matty the Horse to the Sad Case of
A.T.: Defensive and Offensive Use of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 HOUS. L.
REV. 895, 897–99 (1995); see also supra Part I.C.2.
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Federal Rules, the advisory committee noted the three conditions that
historically guaranteed the reliability of testimony—oath, presence before
the fact-finder, and immediate cross-examination—but also recognized:
Common sense tells that much evidence which is not given under the
three conditions may be inherently superior to much that is. Moreover,
when the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy
of doing without. The problem thus resolves itself into effecting a
sensible accommodation between these considerations and the desirability
of giving testimony under the ideal conditions.91

The advisory committee recognized the fundamental conflict between the
desire to exclude hearsay out of concern for fairness to litigants and the
desire to admit all relevant evidence as an aid to accurate decision
making.92 The common law’s solution to this problem was a general rule
excluding hearsay, but subject to many exceptions for particular classes of
hearsay that were deemed especially trustworthy.93 That scheme was
subject to criticism, and the advisory committee evaluated other systems for
determining hearsay admissibility before ultimately deciding that the
Federal Rules would employ a class-exception system similar to the one in
use at common law.94 Importantly, the advisory committee considered a
proposal by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, himself a member of the committee,
that would have done away with the class-exception system and instead left
the hearsay admissibility determination to the discretion of the trial judge,
who would weigh the hearsay’s probative force against its possibility of
prejudice in each case.95 Rejecting that proposal, the committee remarked:
“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been
described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary.’”96 The fact that the
advisory committee explicitly rejected judicial discretion when structuring
the hearsay admissibility rules will be important to consider in the context
of certain circuit court decisions, discussed in Part II, that reject exculpatory
grand jury testimony.97
91. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note.
92. See id.; see also supra Part I.C.1.
93. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note.
94. See id.; see also supra Part I.A. For the class-exception system employed in the
Federal Rules, see Federal Rule of Evidence 802 and the exceptions specified in Rules 803
and 804.
95. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“The Advisory Committee
has rejected [Judge Jack B. Weinstein’s] approach to hearsay as involving too great a
measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, enhancing the
difficulties of preparation for trial, adding a further element to the already over-complicated
congeries of pretrial procedures, and requiring substantially different rules for civil and
criminal cases.”); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV.
331, 338 (1961).
96. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note (quoting James H. Chadbourn,
Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1962)).
97. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual
Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury
Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 435 (1986) (“Under the traditional framework, the
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b. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
The text of the current Rule 804(b)(1) reads:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken
in compliance with law in the course of the same or another
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered,
or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.98

This language differs slightly from that originally drafted by the advisory
committee and sent to Congress for approval.99 The original rule would
have admitted any “[t]estimony given as a witness [at a hearing or
deposition] at the instance of or against a party with an opportunity to
develop the testimony . . . with motive and interest similar to those of the
party against whom now offered.”100 In other words, the rule as originally
promulgated by the Supreme Court would have admitted testimony against
any party in the present proceeding as long as some party at the prior
proceeding had a motive to develop the testimony similar to the motive of
the opposing party.101 As such, the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court
mirrored the trend toward accuracy and admissibility—and away from strict
fairness to litigants—that had developed over time in the common law.102
Not appreciating the general trend in evidence law and developments in the
hearsay exception for prior testimony, however, Congress responded with a
knee-jerk reaction that preserved liberal developments in terms of the
“issues” inquiry but favored fairness to litigants with respect to the “parties”
inquiry.103 While the advisory committee would have admitted any

admission of hearsay is not left to the discretion of the trial court, even if the judge in a
particular case believes that the hearsay is necessary or reliable.”); id. at 436 n.24 (“The
Committee’s rejection indicates that the Federal Rules of Evidence were not intended to
authorize the admission of hearsay whenever the trial judge believed it or determined that the
probative value of the hearsay outweighed its prejudicial effect.”); see also infra notes 203,
210–12 and accompanying text.
98. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
99. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312–13 & n.96.
100. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts & Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321
(1973).
101. See Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 299.
102. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 904 (“The Advisory Committee drafted Rule
804(b)(1) in conformity with the Wigmorean view. . . . The House Committee on the
Judiciary amended the proposed rule to restore the requirement that the party opponent have
had a prior opportunity to question the witness. Thus, the House chose an adversarial
fairness model of litigation over a truth-seeking model, which would have emphasized
maximum availability of generally reliable, relevant evidence.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
supra Part I.C.1–2.
103. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 904; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312–15. The
legislative history of the rule reveals that Congress:
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testimony as long as a party at the previous proceeding had a motive to
develop it similar to that of the opposing party at the present proceeding,104
Congress required that the party against whom the evidence was admitted
be exactly the same in the criminal context and a “successor in interest” in
the civil context.105 Importantly, however, Rule 804(b)(1)’s language—
both as promulgated by the Supreme Court and as amended by Congress—
ensures that prior testimony is not admitted against a party unless that
party’s interests were represented when the testimony was developed at the
previous proceeding.106 Codified as such, the rule reflects liberal necessity
and accuracy concerns in treating the “issues” requirement,107 and it reflects
concern for fairness to litigants in its “parties” requirement.108 Absent from
the rule—both at common law and as enacted by Congress—is any
consideration of how the type of proceeding at which the prior testimony
was developed might bear, in the abstract, upon a party’s motive to examine
the witness.109
D. Rule 804(b)(1) and Grand Jury Testimony
Rule 804(b)(1) asks courts to condition the admissibility of prior
testimony hearsay on a comparison of the opposing party’s “motive” to
examine the witness at the previous proceeding with that party’s
hypothetical “motive” to examine the witness at trial.110 Courts have had
difficulty applying this test to grand jury testimony.111 Not only did the
drafters of the rule provide no guidance, but grand jury proceedings have

[C]onsidered that it is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the
hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the
witness was previously handled by another party. The sole exception to this . . . is
when a party’s predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding had an
opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness. The Committee amended
the Rule to reflect these policy determinations.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 15 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7088.
104. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 904.
105. Id. at 905 & n.71 (“The sole exception in 804(b)(1) to the same party requirement is
that a predecessor in interest will suffice in a civil action or proceeding.”).
106. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining that the crux of
admissibility has to do with whether the prior testimony was “develop[ed] fully” at the
previous proceeding); H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 15 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7075, 7088 (explaining that Rule 804(b)(1), as amended by the House Committee, concerns
whether the party opposing admission of prior testimony had an opportunity to handle the
testifying witness at the previous proceeding); Martin, supra note 4, at 552 (“The proposed
Rules have in effect retained the common-law minimum requirement that the former
testimony be given at a prior hearing in which cross-examination could have been compelled
or was in fact effected.”).
107. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 897–99; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 312–16;
see also supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
108. See Robinson, supra note 90, at 905 & n.71; Weissenberger, supra note 23, at 313–
14 (explaining that the House revision of Rule 804(b)(1) reflected an intent that litigants in
civil matters should not be faced with prior testimony developed by any parties but
themselves or their close privies).
109. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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unique characteristics that make determining a prosecutor’s “motive” for
questioning especially difficult.112 This section compares prosecutorial
examination of grand jury witnesses with defense examination of
preliminary hearing witnesses to demonstrate how strategic choices made
by attorneys in each situation have influenced courts’ “similar motive”
analyses and led to inconsistent admissibility results.113
1. The Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony Under Rule 804(b)(1)
Rule 804(b)(1) admits “[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing
of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding . . . .”114 Despite a
lack of guidance from the common law or from the drafters of the Federal
Rule, it is now clear that this language pertains to grand jury testimony of
an unavailable witness.115 The admissibility of grand jury testimony
pursuant to the hearsay exception for prior testimony remains controversial,
however.116

112. See infra Part I.D.1–2.
113. See infra Part I.D.2.b.i.
114. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
115. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 321 (1992), “all but held that Rule
804(b)(1) could embrace grand jury testimony”); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, WHARTON’S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 470–92 (12th ed. 1955) (stating that grand jury testimony is
admissible under the hearsay exception for prior testimony but failing to discuss the subject
in any detail); Article, A Comparison and Analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
New York Evidentiary Law (Rule 804(b)(1): Former Testimony), 12 TOURO L. REV. 601,
602 (1996); see also infra Part I.D.2.b.
116. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355–56 (explaining that “the
Circuits appear divided as to whether in typical grand jury situations exculpatory testimony
meets this [‘similar motive’] requirement of the Rule”); Valerie A. DePalma, Comment,
United States v. DiNapoli: Admission of Exculpatory Grand Jury Testimony Against the
Government Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), 61 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 572 &
nn.163–64 (1995) (listing sources that discuss the admission of grand jury testimony
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1), primarily with respect to testimony offered against the
defendant).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, the primary problem with introducing grand
jury testimony against a defendant pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1) is that, because the grand jury
proceeding is ex parte, the defendant would not have had an “opportunity” to develop the
testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1139. The Federal
Rules of Evidence aside, admitting grand jury testimony against the defendant is also
problematic under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which assures to the
accused in criminal prosecutions the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note;
Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1139–40.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992), it
seems clear that Rule 804(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for the admission of grand jury
testimony against the government. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523. The Salerno holding did not,
however, clarify how the rule’s “similar motive” test should be applied to grand jury
testimony or, specifically, what factors courts should consider to determine whether a
prosecutor had a “similar motive” to examine a grand jury witness. Cf. 505 U.S. at 324–25
(declining to address the issue and remanding to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for consideration of the meaning of “similar motive”).
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In a number of cases, courts have admitted grand jury testimony against
the government under Rule 804(b)(1) without much discussion.117 In other
cases, courts have held that the prosecution’s objective while examining a
grand jury witness is not sufficiently similar to its objective for crossexamining the same witness at trial to justify admitting the grand jury
testimony.118 Cross-examination is the key to the reliability of prior
testimony, so the very fact that the prosecution does not cross-examine
witnesses in grand jury proceedings would seem to suggest that grand jury
testimony should not be admissible against the government.119 The
advisory committee addressed this problem in its note to Rule 804(b)(1),
however, and offered that the solution is “simply to recognize direct and
redirect examination of one’s own witness as the equivalent of crossexamining an opponent’s witness.”120 The central problem with admitting
grand jury testimony against the government stems not from whether
“cross-examination” was technically conducted at a grand jury proceeding,
but from Rule 804(b)(1)’s requirement that the party against whom the
testimony is offered must have had a “similar motive to develop the
testimony” at the previous proceeding.121 The government’s position in a
number of cases where the defendant seeks to introduce grand jury
testimony from an unavailable witness is that the inherent characteristics of
grand jury proceedings preclude any possibility of finding a “similar
motive.”122 Courts have had difficulty interpreting this elusive requirement
of the rule, leading to the split in the circuit courts which is the subject of
this Note.123
2. Rule 804(b)(1)’s “Opportunity and Similar Motive” Requirement
a. Opportunity
As it appears in Rule 804(b)(1), the word “opportunity” refers not to any
chance that the opponent of prior testimony may have had to examine a
witness on a particular matter, but only to a “meaningful” chance that
117. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 954–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
118. See, e.g., Omar, 104 F.3d at 523–24; United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15
(2d Cir. 1993).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (explaining that Rule
804(b)(1) could seem unfair to apply “[i]f the party against whom [testimony is] now offered
is the one by whom the testimony was offered previously”); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 69–73 (1980) (explaining that cross-examination guarantees the reliability of prior
testimony), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
120. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note; see also Weissenberger,
supra note 35, at 1098–99.
121. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355.
122. See, e.g., Omar, 104 F.3d at 523; United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d
Cir. 1991) (“The government argued, and the district court agreed, that the government’s
motive in developing testimony in front of a grand jury is so different from the motive at
trial that the rule 804(b)(1) hearsay exception does not apply.”), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
123. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355 (explaining the circuit split and citing
cases).
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would have presented itself to a “reasonable attorney.”124 Where it might
have been physically possible for a party to question a witness on a
particular matter but, for various reasons, no reasonable attorney would
have, the “opportunity” element of Rule 804(b)(1) is not satisfied.125
Nevertheless, a party’s mere failure to question a witness on a relevant issue
does not necessarily bar admission of the prior testimony.126 There are
plenty of situations in grand jury and other proceedings where, for strategic
reasons, examining parties intentionally forgo certain lines of
questioning.127 In these situations, if the motive to examine the witness on
a particular issue existed but the examining party simply chose not to
conduct an examination, it would be unfair for the court to allow that
decision to bar the testimony’s admissibility if the witness later becomes
This concern for adversarial fairness is especially
unavailable.128
significant in criminal cases, where the stakes are high.129
Often, witnesses testify before the grand jury under a grant of immunity
from the government.130 The prosecution may well be aware that the
witness is unlikely to testify at trial unless immunity is extended to the trial
proceeding;131 yet, the government is under no obligation to grant immunity
at trial.132 This puts the prosecution in a uniquely powerful position with
respect to developing—or declining to develop—exculpatory grand jury

124. See id. § 302, at 345–46 (“[T]he opportunity to cross-examine must have been such
as to render the cross-examination actually conducted or the decision not to cross-examine
meaningful in the light of the circumstances prevailing when the former testimony was
given.”); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1371; Martin, supra note 4, at 559 (“It is unfair to
hold a party to the former examination if no reasonable attorney would be expected to have
elicited the now-relevant facts . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.D.C. 1964) (refusing to
admit prior testimony where the opposing party could have questioned the witnesses at the
prior proceeding but had no meaningful reason to do so because the parties were not then
adverse).
126. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1371.
127. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 195–97 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that defense counsel may wish not to provide the prosecution with “gratis
discovery” by conducting a full cross-examination at a preliminary hearing); United States v.
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining, inter alia, that when a grand jury
proceeding is conducted while an investigation is ongoing, the prosecution may wish to keep
impeachment evidence secret so as not to compromise the investigation).
128. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 356 & n.14.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1992) (explaining the
defendants’ argument that the exculpatory grand jury testimony at issue in the case should be
admitted against the government to stop the prosecution from using the following tactic: “If
a witness inculpates a defendant during the grand jury proceedings, the United States
immunizes him and calls him at trial; however, if the witness exculpates the defendant . . .
the United States refuses to immunize him and attempts to exclude the testimony as
hearsay.”); Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1105 (noting that “grave consequences flow[]
from criminal convictions”).
130. See, e.g., 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 606.07[1]
(3d ed. 1997) (explaining that “the grand jury is entitled to every person’s testimony,” and
the prosecution may therefore immunize witnesses to overcome valid claims of the privilege
against self-incrimination); Capra, supra note 53.
131. See supra notes 129–30.
132. See Capra, supra note 53; see also supra note 53.
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testimony.133 If the prosecution realizes that a grand jury witness is
providing testimony unfavorable to its case, it can cease questioning the
witness on that matter.134 Later, at trial, after the government refuses to
grant the witness immunity and the witness becomes “unavailable,” the
prosecution can then claim that it had no motive to examine the witness on
the exculpatory matter and hence did not.135 The importance of Rule
804(b)(1)’s “opportunity” requirement is to prevent the prosecution’s—or
any examiner’s—strategic decision to limit questioning from influencing
the admissibility inquiry where a court can determine that a motive to
question the witness nonetheless existed.136
b. Similar Motive
In 1975, when Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1),
there was little guidance for how to apply the rule’s “similar motive”
requirement, even though the language had been present in common law
commentary since at least 1899.137 According to the advisory committee,
the requirement was based on the common law’s “identity of issues”
analysis: “Since identity of issues is significant only in that it bears on
motive and interest in developing fully the testimony of the witness,
expressing the matter in the latter terms is preferable.”138 Treatises at the
time of the Federal Rules’ enactment did not contain very useful
descriptions of what made a motive to examine a witness’s testimony
sufficient to satisfy fairness and reliability requirements necessary for
admission at a later proceeding.139 The advisory committee itself also
provided no criteria for interpreting the “similar motive” language of Rule
804(b)(1).140 This was a useful tactic, in one sense, because the advisory
committee wished to create an admissibility standard more flexible than the
formalistic identity of parties and issues inquiry that had developed in the

133. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 807 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing the
government’s powerful position with respect to the defendant in the conduct of grand jury
proceedings), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
134. See supra note 129.
135. See supra note 129.
136. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, ¶ 17.02[02], at 17-09 to -10 (“The rule is
grounded on the assumption that it is fair to make a party who had the opportunity and
motive to explore testimony at a prior proceeding bear the consequences of a failure to crossexamine adequately or an election not to do so.” (emphasis added)); Weissenberger, supra
note 35, at 1097 (“Where the party forgoes cross-examination, it is not unfair to make him or
her suffer the consequences.”).
137. See Martin, supra note 4, at 557; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
138. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note.
139. See Martin, supra note 4, at 557–58 (“[A]lthough Wigmore first spoke in terms of
interest and motive over 70 years ago [as of 1972], even the latest edition of his treatise does
no more than indicate that in considering the admissibility of former testimony the issues
must be ‘substantially the same,’ and that property law should be a reference, though not
controlling, in determining whether the interests of the respective parties are sufficiently the
same.”).
140. Id. at 557.
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common law.141 For purposes of interpreting how Rule 804(b)(1) should
apply to grand jury testimony offered against the government, however, the
advisory committee’s lack of guidance has been problematic.142 As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in United States v.
DiNapoli, “the Advisory Committee discussed the offeror of testimony at
the prior proceeding in terms primarily applicable to trials and did not
discuss at all the situation where the prior proceeding was a grand jury.”143
Adding to the difficulty of interpreting how the rule should apply is the
inconsistent case law governing two relatively similar situations: first,
where the government seeks to introduce prior preliminary hearing
testimony against defendants; and second, where defendants seek to
introduce prior grand jury testimony against the government.144
i. Motive in the Preliminary Hearing and the Grand Jury
Many cases hold that the defendant’s opportunity and motive to crossexamine a preliminary hearing witness’s testimony is sufficient to guarantee
the reliability of that testimony for admission at trial if the witness becomes
unavailable.145 These decisions tend to focus on the form of the
preliminary hearing, which allows the defendant to cross-examine the
witness on the same issues that will be raised at trial.146 Compared with
trial proceedings, however, preliminary hearings present an inherently
limited vehicle for the defendant to cross-examine inculpatory testimony.147
141. See id. (“Undoubtedly, the Advisory Committee was concerned that it should not
bind trial court discretion by inelastic standards.”); see also supra Part I.C.2. Note that even
though the advisory committee did not want to bind judicial discretion with respect to the
meaning of “similar motive,” this is not the same thing as inviting the kind of broad judicial
discretion championed by Judge Weinstein, who advocated for courts to determine
admissibility based on case-by-case analysis of the hearsay’s probative versus prejudicial
value. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting
“confusion on this issue [the application of Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury testimony] in the
circuits”).
143. 8 F.3d 909, 913 n.4 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).
144. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354–55; see also Capra, supra note 53,
Michael Martin, Grand Jury Testimony Against the Government, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1991,
at 3.
145. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354–55 (citing several supporting cases).
146. See Martin, supra note 144 (“The focus of the decisions is on the preliminary
hearing’s form, in which the accused nominally has an opportunity to cross-examine about
the same factual issues as are raised at trial.”). Grand jury proceedings, by comparison, are
not adversarial. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 807 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d,
505 U.S. 317 (1992); see also infra note 218.
147. E.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Cross-examination at the [preliminary] hearing pales beside that which takes place at trial.
This is so for a number of reasons. First . . . the objective of the hearing is to establish the
presence or absence of probable cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a reasonable
doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to establish probable cause, defense counsel has little reason
at the preliminary hearing to show that it does not conclusively establish guilt . . . . Second,
neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial to disclose its case by extensive
examination at the preliminary hearing; thorough questioning of a prosecution witness by
defense counsel may easily amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State. Third, the
schedules of neither court nor counsel can easily accommodate lengthy preliminary hearings.
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The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to allow a magistrate judge to
determine whether there is probable cause at the time of the hearing “to
believe an offense has been committed and the defendant committed it.”148
If the prosecution meets this burden, the magistrate judge requires the
defendant to appear for further proceedings.149 The preliminary hearing is
adversarial, but the lower burden of proof that the prosecution must meet
(probable cause as opposed to “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” at trial)
often makes it “a foregone conclusion that the defendant will lose.”150 As a
result, defendants often choose to forgo aggressive or complete crossexamination so as to limit the prosecution’s ability to preview the defense
strategy or ascertain useful information, such as the defense’s impeachment
evidence.151 In some cases, the preliminary hearing takes place early in the
course of an investigation and the defendant may not yet have developed
sufficient evidence with which to impeach the witness.152 In other cases,
the magistrate judge may limit the scope of the defense’s cross-examination
to the issue of probable cause, narrowing the range of issues that can be
examined.153 Although these factors taken together might suggest that a
defendant’s motive to examine a witness at a preliminary hearing is not
comparable with the motive at trial—or that a defendant is justified in
taking the strategic decision to limit cross-examination of a preliminary
hearing witness—courts have typically not allowed such considerations to
bar admission of preliminary hearing testimony where the similarity of the
issues alone suggested an opportunity to cross-examine.154
Grand juries serve the dual function of protecting citizens from
unfounded prosecution by the government and of ensuring that probable
cause exists to show that a crime has been committed.155 Indictment by a
Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers not concerned that the proceedings be brief, the
defense and prosecution have generally had inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for
extensive examination. Finally, though counsel were to engage in extensive questioning, a
part of its force would never reach the trial factfinder, who would know the examination
only second hand.”).
148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(e); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 14.1(a), at 714 (4th ed. 2004); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 605.1.03, at 605.1-5.
149. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(e); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 605.1.13, at 605.1-11.
150. Capra, supra note 53; see also Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 1.3(p), at 20–21.
151. See Green, 399 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 147.
152. See Martin, supra note 144.
153. 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 605.1.11, at 605.1-10.
154. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 14.1(d), at 719 (“The preliminary hearing
presents substantially the same issues as the trial . . . . Accordingly, the critical question [for
courts determining the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony against the defendant]
becomes whether the opportunity for cross-examination was sufficient, which does not
require that it have been equal to the cross-examination opportunity at trial. Ordinarily, the
opportunity is deemed adequate unless the magistrate imposed some significant restriction
on the preliminary hearing cross-examination. . . . However, courts have suggested that
insufficiency may be established by showing that defense counsel at the preliminary hearing
lacked crucial information that would have altered the entire character of the crossexamination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Capra, supra note 53; Martin, supra
note 144.
155. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
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grand jury is constitutionally required before any person can be prosecuted
by the federal government for a felony.156 As investigatory bodies, grand
juries have historically had wide latitude to inquire into possible criminal
activity and even to seek assurance that a crime is not being committed.157
Although grand juries traditionally had a measure of independence from
other governmental bodies, today the expansive investigatory power of the
federal grand jury reposes in the executive branch—specifically, the
Department of Justice—which initiates and prepares all cases that come
before any federal grand jury.158 In practical terms, this means that the
prosecutor has an exceptional amount of power in the grand jury
proceeding.159 There are several reasons for this. First, grand jury
proceedings are ex parte, are conducted in secret, and are not presided over
by a judge.160 Second, the prosecutor has discretion to determine the course
of the grand jury investigation, including which witnesses will be called and
the order in which they will appear.161 Third, grand juries may require the
production of witness testimony through the use of subpoenas,162 and the
prosecutor may overcome a witness’s invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination by granting the witness immunity from prosecution and
thus compelling the witness to testify under threat of contempt.163 Fourth,
grand jury proceedings are generally not restrained by the procedural and
evidentiary rules governing criminal trials.164 Finally, commentators have
noted the “psychological pressure” that the “star chamber setting” of grand
jury interrogation imposes on witnesses, which increases the prosecution’s
power to overcome witness resistance and obtain information.165 The
otherwise broad investigatory powers of the grand jury are limited,

156. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”); 24
MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-11 to -13.
157. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at
606-11 (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991)).
158. See 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-13 (“[I]n modern times
the grand jury has lost much of its independent force. Composed of laypersons functioning
in a part-time capacity, the grand jury is no longer capable of taking the initiative in the
complex matters that often arise in federal criminal litigation.”).
159. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.2(c), at 410 (“Today, the critics [of grand
jury practice] argue, the sweeping powers of the grand jury are exercised in reality by the
prosecutor alone.”); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-13 to -14
(explaining the relative power of the prosecutor in the grand jury scheme).
160. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343–44.
161. Id. at 343; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.2(c), at 410.
162. See 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130, § 606.02[1], at 606-13 to -14, § 606.07[1], at
606-110 (“In general, the grand jury is entitled to every person’s testimony, and anyone
summoned to appear is required to do so.”).
163. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.2(c), at 411; 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130,
§ 606.07[1], at 606-110 to -111.
164. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343.
165. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 148, § 8.3(d), at 413 (“[N]o person stands more
alone than a witness before a grand jury; in a secret hearing he faces an often hostile
prosecutor and 23 strangers with no judge present to guard his rights, no lawyer present to
counsel him and sometimes no indication of why he is being questioned.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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however, in that the prosecution may not utilize a grand jury for purposes of
discovery when it is not seeking an indictment.166
The above characteristics of grand jury proceedings typically provide
little incentive for prosecutors to conduct aggressive or complete
examinations of potentially damaging grand jury witnesses.167 Most
significant is the lower burden (probable cause) that the prosecutor must
meet to obtain an indictment than is required for a conviction at trial (“proof
beyond a reasonable doubt”).168 A prosecutor who has met that burden is
unlikely to expend the resources necessary to fully examine a witness
whose testimony runs counter to the prosecution’s theory of the case.169
Similarly, the prosecution will often desire to limit examination of grand
jury witnesses to conceal information or to maintain the secrecy of an
ongoing investigation.170 Furthermore, when grand jury questioning takes
place early in an investigation, the prosecution may not yet possess the
information necessary to impeach a witness, and the issues examined may
not be the same as those that are later relevant at trial.171 It should also be
noted that the prosecution is under no duty to concern itself with
exculpatory grand jury evidence.172
Although the circumstances of grand jury proceedings may suggest that
the government has as little motive to develop exculpatory grand jury
testimony as the defendant has to challenge inculpatory preliminary hearing
testimony, courts generally have been more reluctant to admit grand jury
testimony against the government than to admit preliminary hearing
testimony against defendants.173 The nonadversarial nature of grand jury
166. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (“Grand juries are not
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions . . . .”); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 130,
§ 606.05[2][c], at 606-57 to -58 (“It is not permissible for the prosecutor to subpoena and
question potential trial witnesses to an existing criminal proceeding when the sole or
dominant purpose of such questioning is to obtain evidence for use in the upcoming trial.
Simply stated, it is not a legitimate function of the grand jury to serve as a substitute for
pretrial discovery.” (footnote omitted)).
167. See Capra, supra note 53; see also Martin, supra note 144 (arguing that strategic
concerns diminish a prosecutor’s actual desire to conduct a thorough examination of grand
jury witnesses, and, therefore, “grand jury testimony probably should not be admissible
against the government under Rule 804(b)(1) because it almost never has the circumstantial
assurance of trustworthiness coming from a prosecutor’s motivation to develop it fully”).
168. See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[B]ecause of the low
burden of proof at the grand jury stage, even the prosecutor’s status as an ‘opponent’ of the
testimony does not necessarily create a motive to challenge the testimony that is similar to
the motive at trial.”); Martin, supra note 144; see also supra notes 150, 155 and
accompanying text.
169. See Martin, supra note 144.
170. Capra, supra note 53.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354–55; see also Martin, supra note 144
(“[T]he same factors . . . pointed to as calling for exclusion of grand jury testimony offered
by the defense argue against admitting preliminary hearing testimony offered by the
prosecution. If ‘what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,’ maybe the Salerno
court’s result is correct, after all.”). The “Salerno court” admitted grand jury testimony
against the government on a theory of adversarial fairness alone. See United States v.
Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
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proceedings could be one reason for the differing admissibility
determinations.174 Policy considerations, such as an interest in supporting
the investigative activities of law enforcement, may also drive this result.175
One commentator has suggested what could be another possible
justification for differing admissibility holdings concerning preliminary
hearing and grand jury testimony.176 If certain Supreme Court decisions
upholding the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony against
defendants can be said to create a motive for the defense to fully develop
preliminary hearing testimony,177 then a lack of Supreme Court precedent
affirming the admission of grand jury testimony against the government178
might be said to have the opposite effect, providing more support for the
argument that the government has little motive to fully examine exculpatory
grand jury witnesses.179
ii. Other Motive Considerations
Courts and commentators have supplied additional content to the
meaning of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test since its codification in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. In his concurring opinion in United States v.
Salerno, Justice Harold Blackmun argued that “‘similar motive’ does not
mean ‘identical motive,’” and the admissibility inquiry is therefore
174. Cf. supra note 146 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624, 625 (2d Cir. 1991) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“The panel’s ruling [admitting grand jury testimony against the government]
also creates serious problems for the Government in the development of evidence at the
grand jury. If the Government calls to the grand jury witnesses other than those who are
certain to give testimony helpful to the prosecution (and the Government will frequently
prefer to call witnesses of this sort, both to investigate undeveloped matters and to freeze a
hostile or wavering witness’s testimony), it must then accept admission of their hearsay at
trial if offered by the defense, or severely limit its opportunity to prosecute them by
conferring use immunity.” (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 853–73 (D.C. Cir.
1990))); 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 410 (5th ed. 1990) (“[R]uling that the government is deemed to have an adequate
opportunity to examine witnesses before a grand jury for purposes of Rule 804(b)(1) would
require that the government treat the grand jury investigation in every case as if it were a
trial. This would greatly extend the proceedings and complicate them more than is
necessary. Arguably, it would be good policy for the government to call all witnesses before
grand juries and to develop all testimony fully for the benefit of the defense and the
prosecution. But this is not the grand jury system as it now exists for federal
prosecutions . . . .”).
176. See Martin, supra note 4, at 562 n.75.
177. See id. (remarking that decisions such as California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165–66
(1970), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965), “which indicate that there is at least
no confrontation clause violation when testimony given at a ‘full-fledged’ preliminary
hearing is offered at trial . . . may by themselves provide a motive and interest in full
development of the [preliminary hearing] testimony” by the defendant).
178. Only United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 321 (1992), holds that grand jury
testimony may be admitted against the government as prior testimony hearsay pursuant to
Rule 804(b)(1), and it does so by implication. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523
(1st Cir. 1997) (noting that, in Salerno, 505 U.S. at 321, “the Supreme Court all but held that
Rule 804(b)(1) could embrace grand jury testimony”).
179. For reasons why the government lacks motive to develop exculpatory grand jury
testimony, see supra notes 160–72 and accompanying text.
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inherently “factual,” with its outcome depending on analysis of the specific
circumstances surrounding the grand jury questioning in each case.180
Similarly, commentators have argued that the inquiry is concerned
primarily with comparing a reasonable attorney’s motive to develop facts at
the previous proceeding with the attorney’s hypothetical motive to develop
those facts at trial.181 The majority in Salerno confirmed that Rule
804(b)(1) must be interpreted according to its plain language and not by
reference to expansive policy considerations.182 In situations where
information that would have been useful for examining a witness at a prior
proceeding first surfaces subsequent to that proceeding, this alone is not
enough to render the prior testimony inadmissible where the existing
motive for examination was satisfactory in light of the circumstances
prevailing at the second proceeding.183 Furthermore, Federal Rule of
Evidence 806 allows for impeachment of prior testimony hearsay in the
same manner as if the witness were available at trial, so an opposing party
is not without the ability to bring newly developed evidence to bear on
discrediting prior testimony.184 Where courts have found that the issues at
180. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Moreover . . . the similarmotive inquiry appropriately reflects narrow concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence
admitted at trial—not broad policy concerns favoring either the Government in the conduct
of grand jury proceedings or the defendant in overcoming the refusal of other witnesses to
testify.”); see also Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 404, 406 (D.C. 1993) (admitting
exculpatory grand jury testimony and explaining that because the prosecution focused its
inquiry on the defendant’s guilt at both proceedings it did not matter that the prosecutor did
not assume as “adversarial, inquiring, searching, and explicative” of an approach as the
prosecution at trial might have wished for (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. See Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1101–02 (“The Rule seeks to achieve fairness
by imposing factual testimony on a party only where the party . . . had a motive to develop
or, alternatively, to limit the weight of the testimony at the former proceeding. Accordingly,
the similar motive requirement should be read to mean ‘motive to develop facts’ or ‘motive
to limit the weight to be accorded the prior testimony.’” (footnote omitted)); see also Martin,
supra note 4, at 558–59 (“Since the opponent’s argument against admission of former
testimony is that he is deprived of the opportunity to bring out relevant facts, the objective of
the motive and interest test is to determine whether there is any significant reason why facts
relevant to the present inquiry . . . would not have been elicited at the prior hearing. A
‘significant reason’ for these purposes would be one which would affect the conduct of the
examination by a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances. It is unfair to hold a party
to the former examination if no reasonable attorney would be expected to have elicited the
now-relevant facts; but if the circumstances were such that those facts could have been
brought out if they were available, the present opponent can fairly be held.”).
182. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 321 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that Rule 804(b)(1)
should not be applied in a “slavishly literal fashion” and holding that a court may not admit
prior testimony under the rule “absent satisfaction of each of the Rule’s elements” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir.
1992) (“The Supreme Court has made clear in recent years that the Federal Rules of
Evidence . . . are to be read with regard to their ‘plain meaning.’” (citing Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 178–79 (1987)), vacated en banc sub nom. United States v. DiNapoli,
8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993); Capra, supra note 53 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application
of the plain meaning rule).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994).
184. According to Rule 806, “[w]hen a hearsay statement . . . has been admitted in
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported,
by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a
witness.” FED. R. EVID. 806. See also Capra, supra note 53 (explaining that the Second
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the two proceedings are sufficiently different, such that “questions on a
particular subject would have been largely irrelevant at the earlier
proceeding,” the prior proceeding’s testimony has generally been held
inadmissible.185
Ultimately, the “similar motive” inquiry requires that “the issues in the
first proceeding, and hence the purpose for which the testimony was
offered, must have been such [that the present opponent had] an adequate
motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony.”186
The rule ensures fairness to litigants by preventing the imposition of a prior
proceeding’s factual testimony on a party unless that party “had a motive to
develop or, alternatively, to limit the weight of the testimony at the former
proceeding.” 187 The rule is not only concerned with fairness, however; the
advisory committee’s adoption of Dean Wigmore’s “interests and motives”
formulation demonstrates that the rule is also meant to serve necessity
concerns by providing the fact-finder with as much information as possible
under a less restrictive admissibility framework than common law courts
employed.188
The next part of this Note examines recent U.S. Courts of Appeals cases
where Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test was used to admit or deny
grand jury testimony offered against the government. The issues detailed
above concerning the meaning of “similar motive” will be discussed in the
context of the influence they had on the courts’ decisions, and those
decisions themselves will be analyzed for the purpose of devising a uniform
“similar motive” admissibility test for grand jury testimony offered against
the government.
II. CASES APPLYING RULE 804(b)(1)’S “SIMILAR MOTIVE” TEST TO
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY OFFERED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
A split has developed in the circuit courts over the proper interpretation
of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” language in the context of admitting
grand jury testimony against the government.189 The Second and First
Circuits have construed the requirement narrowly and issued decisions
suggesting that exculpatory grand jury testimony would rarely be

Circuit panel in United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806–08 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505
U.S. 317 (1992), admitted prior testimony against the government partly on fairness grounds,
based on the fact that the government would never have lost the ability to impeach the
unavailable witness’s testimony under Rule 806).
185. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 302, at 346 (citing United States v. Wingate, 520
F.2d 309, 315–16 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that testimony from a hearing on a motion to
suppress due to involuntariness is not admissible at trial where the innocence of the
defendant is at issue)); see also Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1102 (“The critical issue
raised by Rule 804(b)(1) is whether to admit the evidence or completely sacrifice the
testimony of the [declarant]; consequently, only genuinely dissimilar motives should result
in exclusion.”).
186. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 354.
187. Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1101–02.
188. See supra Part I.C.1–2.
189. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 304, at 355.
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admissible against the government.190 The District of Columbia, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits, by contrast, have compared the government’s motives “at a
high level of generality”191 and have issued decisions suggesting that
exculpatory grand jury testimony is almost always admissible against the
government.192 This section will analyze the facts of each case, each
court’s specific interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1), and other factors—such as
policy considerations and judicial discretion—that led to the divergent
holdings.
A. The Second and First Circuits’ Narrow Admissibility Decisions
In the two cases that follow, the courts wrestled with how to determine
whether exculpatory testimony should be admitted against the government
under Rule 804(b)(1). Both courts ultimately excluded the testimony,
reasoning, inter alia, that the nature of the grand jury proceeding itself
generally precludes a finding of “similar motive.”193
1. The Second Circuit: United States v. DiNapoli
a. Facts and Procedural History
On April 7, 1987, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New
York returned a thirty-five–count third superseding indictment against
eleven defendants, including Anthony Salerno and Vincent DiNapoli, for
alleged RICO violations related to mafia activity.194 The trial lasted
thirteen months and focused primarily on the government’s attempts to
prove that the defendants were involved in a scheme to rig bids for concrete
construction work in Manhattan.195 By controlling labor unions and the
supply of concrete, the Genovese organization was able to ensure that all
large concrete projects were allocated among a select group of contractors,
called the “Club,” who then paid a fee to the defendants.196 Pursuant to its
obligation under Brady v. Maryland,197 the prosecution informed the
defendants that two witnesses, Pasquale J. Bruno and Frederick DeMatteis,
had testified before the grand jury under a grant of immunity and provided
“potentially exculpatory evidence.”198 These two witnesses were principals
in the Cedar Park Concrete Construction Corporation, alleged to belong to

190. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993).
191. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2009).
192. See id. at 963; United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
193. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523; DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15.
194. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 800–01 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Salerno
I], rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
195. Id. at 801–02.
196. Id. at 802.
197. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutors violate due process when they fail
to turn over exculpatory evidence to defendants upon request).
198. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 804.
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the “Club,” yet the two men testified that no such “Club” existed.199 To
counter their testimony, the prosecution confronted them with a wiretapped
conversation—which had been made public at a previous trial—implicating
the witnesses’ company in the bid-rigging scheme.200 Referring to its grand
jury examination, the prosecution later claimed that “[w]e did not crossexamine Bruno and did not tip our cards, and the same thing was true with
respect to DeMatteis.”201
Before the grand jury, Bruno and DeMatteis each gave contradictory
testimony.202 At one point, Bruno was excused from the grand jury room
and told, upon his return, that the grand jurors strongly doubted the
truthfulness of his testimony.203 Four days after Bruno testified, his lawyer
informed the prosecutor that Bruno’s testimony may have been false.204 He
suggested that Bruno would submit new answers by affidavit if the
prosecution would agree to furnish the questions in writing, but the
prosecution declined to do so.205
At their trial, the defendants subpoenaed Bruno and DeMatteis to testify,
but the witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.206 The defendants then requested that the government grant
the witnesses immunity.207 When the government declined, the defendants
moved to introduce Bruno and DeMatteis’s grand jury testimony pursuant
to Rule 804(b)(1).208 To maintain the secrecy of the grand jury transcripts,
the district judge conferred ex parte with the prosecution regarding the
defendants’ motion.209 The prosecution explained that it had little motive
to develop the testimony of witnesses who were known to be lying.210 It
also argued, in general terms, that prosecutorial motive for investigating
witnesses in the grand jury is so different from motive at trial that Rule
804(b)(1) should not apply.211 The district court agreed and denied the
defendants’ motion.212
199. Id. at 804, 808.
200. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 911 (2d Cir. 1993).
201. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Salerno II]
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated en banc sub nom. United
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
202. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911 n.1.
203. Id. at 911.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
207. Salerno I, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
208. Id.
209. Salerno II, 974 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated en banc sub nom. United
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
210. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806 (explaining that the prosecution had submitted sealed
affidavits arguing that it has “little or no incentive to conduct a thorough cross-examination
of Grand Jury witnesses who appear to be falsifying their testimony” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
211. Id.
212. Id. (“The government argued, and the district court agreed, that the government’s
motive in developing testimony in front of a grand jury is so different from the motive at
trial that the Rule 804(b)(1) hearsay exception does not apply.”).
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After their conviction, the defendants appealed.213 A panel of the Second
Circuit held that the district court had improperly denied admission of the
grand jury testimony.214 Because the witnesses could have been made
available through a grant of immunity, the court reasoned, Bruno and
DeMatteis were only “unavailable” to the defendants.215 Therefore, the
same bar that stops a party from procuring a witness’s unavailability so as
to admit prior testimony216 should also prohibit the government from
invoking Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test to block the admission of
prior testimony where the government’s refusal to grant immunity
effectively kept the witnesses from the courtroom.217 In the court’s
reasoning, concern for fairness to the defendants and the prevention of
governmental overreaching counseled in favor of admissibility,218
regardless of whether the explicit requirements of the “similar motive” test
were met.219 The court also reasoned that grand jury proceedings are by
their nature adverse to defendants, so the admission of grand jury testimony
against the government does not raise the kind of reliability concerns that
are present when, for instance, grand jury testimony is offered against the
defendant.220 Finally, the court reasoned that the government had violated
the spirit of Brady v. Maryland221 by informing the defendants that the
witnesses had provided testimony favorable to them and then trying to
exclude that testimony at trial.222

213. Id. at 803.
214. Id. at 808.
215. Id. at 806 (“Had Bruno and DeMatteis been, for example, ill or dead at the time of
trial (and therefore, under rule 804(a)(4), ‘unavailable’ to either side), the district court
would have properly inquired whether the government had a ‘similar motive’ to examine
them in the grand jury before allowing their testimony before the grand jury to be admitted
under rule 804(b)(1), because neither the government nor the defendant would be able to
examine the witness at trial. But since these witnesses were available to the government at
trial through a grant of immunity, the government’s motive in examining the witnesses at the
grand jury was irrelevant.”).
216. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
217. See Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806–07. Note that the government is not required to grant
immunity to a witness who has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 807;
see also Capra, supra note 53.
218. See Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807 (“[W]hen the defendant wishes to introduce the grand
jury testimony that the government used to obtain his indictment, . . . concerns about
reliability and accuracy are absent. Every factor present in the grand jury—the ex parte
nature of the proceeding, the leading questions by the government, the absence of the
defendant, the tendency of a witness to favor the government because of the grant of
immunity, the absence of confrontation—is adverse to the interest of the defendants, not the
government. . . . Since the witnesses were only unilaterally ‘unavailable’ and could have
been subjected to cross-examination by the government, we will not countenance the
exclusion of their grand jury testimony on the ground of purported fairness to the
government.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 221–22.
219. See Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806 (“While we agree that the government may have had
no motive before the grand jury to impeach the allegedly false testimony of Bruno and
DeMatteis, we do not think that is sufficient to exclude the evidence at trial.”).
220. Id. at 807; see also supra notes 116, 218.
221. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also supra note 197.
222. Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807.
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b. The Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Salerno
After the Second Circuit denied the government’s petition for a rehearing
en banc,223 the government appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed
the panel’s decision.224 The Court held that prior testimony is not
admissible pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1) unless the “similar motive” test is
satisfied; adversarial fairness alone is not grounds for admitting prior
testimony under the rule.225 The Court declined to decide whether the
government had a “similar motive” to question Bruno and DeMatteis before
the grand jury, however, and remanded for further consideration of the
government’s “motive” in light of the evidentiary standard prescribed by
the Court.226
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the district court’s
suggestion that prosecutorial motive to examine witnesses before the grand
jury is never sufficiently similar to its motive at trial.227 He argued:
Because “similar motive” does not mean “identical motive,” the similarmotive inquiry, in my view, is inherently a factual inquiry, depending in
part on the similarity of the underlying issues and on the context of the
grand jury questioning. It cannot be that the prosecution either always or
never has a similar motive for questioning a particular witness with
respect to a particular issue before the grand jury as at trial.228

Furthermore, Justice Blackmun argued, the similar motive inquiry should
not reflect policy favoring either the government or the defendant; it should
focus solely on the reliability of the testimony in evidentiary terms.229
Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the government did
have a similar motive and opportunity to examine Bruno and DeMatteis
before the grand jury because the witnesses’ testimony was inconsistent
with the prosecution’s theory of the case.230 According to Justice Stevens,
although the government argued lack of motive in the abstract, the
transcript revealed otherwise.231 By probing the basis of the witnesses’
statements regarding the existence of the “Club” and introducing wiretap
evidence to contradict them, the prosecution demonstrated that it possessed

223. United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624, 624 (2d Cir. 1991). Judge Jon O. Newman,
who would later write the DiNapoli opinion, dissented from the denial. Id. Among his
arguments was that the Second Circuit’s holding would frustrate the government’s
development of grand jury testimony. Id. at 625–26; see also supra note 175.
224. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 325 (1992).
225. See id. at 321; Article, supra note 115, at 601.
226. Salerno, 505 U.S. at 325 (“The Court of Appeals, as noted, erroneously concluded
that the respondents did not have to demonstrate a similar motive in this case to make use of
Rule 804(b)(1). It therefore declined to consider fully the arguments now presented by the
parties about whether the United States had such a motive.”).
227. See id. at 325–26 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 326.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 326–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] party has a motive to cross-examine any
witness who, in her estimation, is giving false or inaccurate testimony about a fact that is
material to the legal question at issue in the proceeding.”).
231. See id. at 327–28, 331–32.

2010]

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

1245

a motive to examine the witnesses’ grand jury testimony on the issues
relevant at trial.232 Justice Stevens also argued that strategic considerations
should not influence the “similar motive” inquiry:
[A] party might decide—for tactical reasons or otherwise—not to engage
in a rigorous cross-examination, or even in any cross-examination at all.
In such a case, however, I do not believe that it is accurate to say that the
party lacked a similar motive to cross-examine the witness; instead, it is
more accurate to say that the party had a similar motive to cross-examine
the witness . . . but chose not to act on that motive.”233

Thus, for Justice Stevens, there is a distinction between the reasons a
prosecutor might want to limit questioning at the grand jury and the bare
“motive” the prosecutor would otherwise have to question the witness; and
the reasons for limiting questioning should not intrude on the “motive”
analysis.234
c. The Second Circuit Panel Decision on Remand
On remand from the Supreme Court, a panel of the Second Circuit held
that the prosecution had a similar motive to examine the witnesses before
the grand jury, and, therefore, the district court should have admitted Bruno
and DeMatteis’s testimony.235 The court explained that the “similar
motive” test does not require finding an “identical” motive; it stressed that
“similar motive” exists where “the issues in the two proceedings [are]
sufficiently similar to assure that the opposing party had a meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine when the testimony was first offered.”236
Despite the government’s argument in the abstract that grand jury
proceedings do not support finding a “similar motive” to develop testimony,
the court held that the transcript of the grand jury questioning demonstrated
a prosecutorial attempt to discredit the witnesses’ testimony within the
meaning of the “similar motive” test.237 The court also described what may
be thought of as a two-part test to determine whether a prosecutor
demonstrates “similar motive” to examine a grand jury witness.238 First, a
232. See id. at 326–28, 332.
233. See id. at 329 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
234. See id. at 329–30 (“[N]either the fact that the prosecutors might decline to crossexamine a grand jury witness whom they fear will talk to the target of the investigation nor
the fact that they might choose to undermine the witness’ credibility other than through
rigorous cross-examination alters the fact that they had an opportunity and similar motive to
challenge the allegedly false testimony through questioning before the grand jury. Although
those might be reasons for declining to take advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness, neither undermines the principal motive for engaging in cross-examination, i.e., to
shake the witness’ allegedly false or misleading testimony.”). But see Capra, supra note 53
(arguing that Justice John Paul Stevens’s refusal to include strategic concerns in the “similar
motive” analysis is too “harsh” an application of the rule).
235. Salerno II, 974 F.2d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated en banc sub nom. United
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
236. See id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 1975)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
237. See id. at 240–41.
238. See id. at 239.
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court should look to the examination that was “in fact” conducted to
determine if it is equivalent to the examination the prosecution would wish
to conduct at trial.239 If the results are inconclusive, the court should
determine, objectively, whether a “reasonable examiner under the
circumstances” would have had a similar motive to develop the witness’s
testimony.240 According to the court, “[t]his latter inquiry ensures that the
failure to vigorously examine the witness—for tactical reasons or
otherwise—does not insulate the prior testimony from admission.”241 This
language suggests that, under the court’s test, a prosecutor’s strategic
decision to forgo examination on a particular issue might not factor into the
“similar motive” analysis.242 But, because the panel concluded that the
grand jury transcript demonstrated a “similar motive,” the panel did not
clearly apply its “reasonable examiner” test to the facts in this case.243
d. The Rehearing en Banc Decision: United States v. DiNapoli
Again the government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and this time it
was granted.244 The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s
decision and held that Bruno and DeMatteis’s grand jury testimony was not
admissible.245 The court reasoned that, because the “similar motive”
inquiry is inherently factual, it is possible for the government to have a
motive at the grand jury that is equivalent to its motive at trial.246 But, in
this case, the government’s interest in discrediting the witnesses’ testimony
was substantially less “intense” than it would have been at trial.247 The
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 240–41 (“Nevertheless . . . the court need not turn to abstract notions of
“motive” if what the examiner actually did in the prior proceeding was “similar” to what the
examination would be in the current one.”); see also Judith M. Mercier, Student Topic,
United States v. Salerno: An Examination of Rule 804(b)(1), 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 336–
40 (1993) (arguing that the panel’s “reasonable examiner” test is the correct one for
admissibility of grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) but implying that the panel meant
to include, rather than exclude, strategic considerations as a factor bearing on “motive”).
244. See United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 910 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc). Anthony
Salerno, one of the defendants from the earlier proceedings, died during the pendency of the
appeal, and the Second Circuit issued its en banc decision under case name United States v.
DiNapoli. Id. at 911 n.2.
245. Id. at 910, 915.
246. See id. at 913–14 (“[W]e do not accept the position, urged by the Government upon
the Supreme Court, that a prosecutor generally will not have the same motive to develop
testimony in grand jury proceedings as he does at trial. Though the Supreme Court declined
to assess that contention . . . we discern in its opinion a reluctance to engraft any general
exception onto Rule 804(b)(1).” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Compare this reasoning with the district court’s earlier conclusion that grand jury
proceedings, by their nature, preclude a finding of “similar motive.” See supra notes 210–12,
227–28 and accompanying text.
247. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15 (“[T]he inquiry as to similar motive must be fact
specific, and the grand jury context will sometimes, but not invariably, present
circumstances that demonstrate the prosecutor’s lack of a similar motive. We accept neither
the Government’s view that the prosecutor’s motives at the grand jury and at trial are almost
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court explained: “The test must turn not only on whether the questioner is
on the same side of the same issue at both proceedings, but also on whether
the questioner had . . . a substantially similar degree of interest in prevailing
on that issue.”248 The court read Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive”
language as requiring nearly equivalent stakes at both proceedings.249
The court also noted that “[t]he nature of the two proceedings,” including
“what is at stake and the applicable burden of proof,” as well as the
examination at the prior proceeding, “both what was undertaken and what
was available but forgone,” should factor into the analysis.250 Where two
proceedings are different in their purposes or burden of proof, a party’s
motives for questioning a witness could differ, even though that party is on
the same “side” at both proceedings.251 Motive depends upon many things,
including the stage of the investigation at the time the witness is examined
and what the prosecution desires to use the witness’s testimony for at that
stage of its investigation.252
Applying the above principles to this case, the court concluded that there
were two overriding reasons why the government lacked a similar motive to
examine Bruno and DeMatteis before the grand jury: (1) the defendants
were already indicted, so the prosecution had no need to undermine
testimony that exculpated them; and (2) the prosecution had no interest in
proving the witnesses’ testimony false because the grand jurors themselves
had informed the prosecution that they did not believe Bruno’s
testimony.253 The court also noted that the prosecution limited its
questioning to matters that were already publicly disclosed so as not to
reveal information that remained secret at that stage of the investigation.254
Judge George C. Pratt, who wrote the panel’s decision on remand from
the Supreme Court, dissented.255 He believed that the en banc majority
erred by rewriting the “similar motive” test into a “same motive” test.256
The majority’s admissibility requirement, he argued, was stricter than the
one for which the Federal Rules of Evidence called.257 Judge Pratt also
criticized the majority for accepting at face value the government’s own
always dissimilar, nor the opposing view, apparently held by the District of Columbia
Circuit, that the prosecutor’s motives in both proceedings are always similar. . . . The proper
approach . . . in assessing similarity of motive under Rule 804(b)(1) must consider whether
the party resisting the offered testimony at a pending proceeding had at a prior proceeding an
interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a
substantially similar issue.”).
248. Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
249. See id. at 914–15; see also supra note 247.
250. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915.
251. See id. at 912–15.
252. See id. at 913.
253. See id. at 915. Note that the prosecutor’s belief that questioning was unnecessary
because the jurors disbelieved the testimony is dubious because “[t]he grand jurors had not
informed the prosecutor that they found Bruno’s testimony incredible until after Bruno had
testified.” See DePalma, supra note 116, at 588.
254. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915.
255. Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting); see also supra Part II.A.1.c.
256. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
257. See id.
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after-the-fact, self-serving arguments about its motive at the grand jury
proceeding.258 Instead of applying its own test, the court had simply
accepted the government’s argument that it had no motive to impeach
Bruno and DeMatteis.259 Finally, Judge Pratt questioned why the
prosecution was using the grand jury at all if the prosecution was so secure
in its indictments that it did not need to challenge exculpatory testimony.260
e. Summary
The district court excluded Bruno and DeMatteis’s testimony because it
agreed with the government that the nature of the grand jury proceeding
itself provides prosecutors little motive to examine exculpatory
witnesses.261 It also agreed that, in this case, there was little motive to
examine the witnesses because the jurors did not credit their testimony.262
The Second Circuit panel admitted the testimony primarily to promote a
policy of fairness to the defendants.263 It noted that grand jury proceedings
inherently favor the government and that Bruno and DeMatteis were not,
strictly speaking, “unavailable” to the government.264 The prosecution
would never have lost the opportunity to impeach the testimony had it been
admitted.265
The Supreme Court implied that the “similar motive” inquiry is factual,
so the legal conclusion that the nature of grand jury proceedings precludes a
finding of similar motive is untenable.266 The Court also ruled that the
evidentiary terms of the rule must be satisfied; prior testimony cannot be
admitted based on a policy of correcting an unequal balance of power
between two parties or of protecting one party from the other.267
On remand, the Second Circuit panel upheld the admission of Bruno and
DeMatteis’s testimony because the transcript of their grand jury
examination demonstrated prosecutorial motive sufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 804(b)(1).268 The court described a reasonable
examiner test for similar motive which, as explained, would ensure that

258. Id.; see also supra notes 210–11, 253 and accompanying text.
259. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 210–11, 253 and
accompanying text. Judge Robert J. Miner, in his dissent, argued that the prosecution had
actually tried to establish the falsity of the grand jury testimony. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 917
(Miner, J., dissenting). He cited the fact that the prosecution had told Bruno that the grand
jurors disbelieved his testimony as an attempt to impeach it and to provide Bruno with an
opportunity to correct it. Id.
260. Id. at 916 (Pratt, J., dissenting) (noting that it is improper to utilize the grand jury for
discovery purposes); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 225, 227–28, 246 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 237, 243 and accompanying text.
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“tactical” limitations on questioning would not bar admissibility of prior
testimony.269
Finally, on rehearing, an en banc majority of the Second Circuit vacated
the panel’s decision and excluded the testimony.270 It agreed with the
government that there is no motive to examine exculpatory grand jury
witnesses (1) whom the jurors themselves disbelieve, and (2) when the
defendants’ indictments are secure.271 It also reasoned that the lower
evidentiary burden at the grand jury makes the motive to challenge
exculpatory testimony less “intense” than it would be at trial, and therefore
not “similar.”272 The court credited the argument that the prosecution’s
desire to maintain the secrecy of information diminishes motive.273
The courts above considered several factors in applying Rule 804(b)(1)’s
“similar motive” test to Bruno and DeMatteis’s grand jury testimony:
whether the testimony itself was credible, whether the nature of grand jury
examinations precludes a finding of “similar motive,” the power balance
between the prosecution and the defense with respect to obtaining evidence
in the grand jury, whether a “similar motive” ruling may be made as a
matter of law, and whether the “similar motive” analysis encompasses
strategic use of questioning. These issues reappear in the cases that follow.
2. The First Circuit: United States v. Omar
In United States v. Omar,274 the defendants appealed from convictions
for bank larceny, money laundering, and conspiracy.275 The charges
stemmed from the 1991 staged hijacking of a Brinks armored car, driven by
one of the defendants, from which the defendants stole approximately
$900,000.276 The government’s most damning evidence came from the trial
testimony of Lee Najarian, who lived with a friend of defendant Sohiel
Omar named Raymond Femino, and who testified that Omar brought a
large trash bag full of cash to her and Femino’s house on the night of the
robbery.277 She and Femino had run a trash hauling firm, and she testified
that some of the stolen money had been deposited into the firm’s account,
out of which Omar directed her to write checks on his behalf.278
Najarian first testified before a grand jury in 1993 and, on that occasion,
denied having any knowledge of the robbery or bank deposits.279 Several
months later, however, under a grant of immunity, Najarian gave testimony
similar to that which she delivered at trial.280 At a much earlier grand jury
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See supra notes 238–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 247–53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
104 F.3d 519 (1st Cir. 1997).
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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session in 1991, before Najarian’s damning testimony, Femino testified “for
about 10 to 20 minutes” on various aspects of the case and “briefly but
flatly denied receiving money from Omar” in any form.281 Femino died in
1993 and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.282 To counter
Najarian’s testimony, the defendants sought to introduce Femino’s 1991
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).283
The district court excluded Femino’s testimony, and the only question on
appeal was whether the exclusion was error.284 Case law from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had previously held that Rule
804(b)(1) did not apply to grand jury testimony.285 The court conceded,
however, that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Salerno, “all but held
that Rule 804(b)(1) could embrace grand jury testimony.”286 Nonetheless,
the court agreed with the government’s general argument that “the
prosecution ordinarily does not in a grand jury proceeding have the kind of
motive to develop testimony that it would in an ordinary trial or that is
required to meet the express test and rationale of Rule 804(b)(1).”287 The
court cited certain factors to support its position. First, trials are ordinarily
“last chance” proceedings for both sides;288 in the grand jury, by
comparison, the government is often only seeking information as part of an
investigation and neither aims to discredit, nor to vouch for, witnesses.289
Second, because of the low burden that the government must meet at grand
jury proceedings and the fact that the government calls its own witnesses
and can call as many as it likes, discrediting individual grand jury witnesses
is usually not essential, as it would be at trial.290
Applying the “similar motive” test to Femino’s grand jury testimony, the
First Circuit held that it was not admissible.291 Because his examination
took place so early in the investigation, long before Najarian offered
testimony that directly contradicted Femino’s, “the government had no
meaningful opportunity to discredit Femino at the time.”292 Also, because
other evidence already implicated the defendants at the time, and because
Femino’s exculpatory statements were a minor part of his overall testimony,
the government “had no reason to fear that Femino’s terse denials, if he

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 520.
285. Id. at 522–23; see United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1990).
286. Omar, 104 F.3d at 523 (citing United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 325 (1992),
remanding for a determination of whether grand jury testimony meets Rule 804(b)(1)’s
“similar motive” requirement, implying that grand jury testimony is admissible under the
rule).
287. See id.
288. See id. (“If a new trial later becomes necessary and the witness proves unavailable, it
may be a fair guess that each side has already done at the original trial all that the party
would do if the declarant were now present for a new trial.”).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 523–24.
292. See id. at 523.

2010]

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

1251

were not directly confronted, would lead the grand jury to refuse to
indict.”293 The court reasoned that, because the indictment was not in
jeopardy, the government lacked a motive to discredit the exculpatory
testimony similar to the motive it would have at trial.294 The court also
stated that the government could have been trying to conceal information
from Femino at the early stage of the investigation during which he was
questioned, but the government did not make this argument.295
Importantly, however, the court, in dicta, stated that, even if the prosecution
had forgone questioning to preserve secrecy, this strategic withholding of
information would contribute to a lack of motive to examine.296
The primary basis for this court’s decision to exclude Femino’s
testimony was its finding that at the time of his examination, early in the
investigation, the prosecution did not yet possess sufficient information
with which to challenge his exculpatory testimony.297 The court also,
however, linked “motive” to the strategic considerations that influence
grand jury examination and reasoned that, where it would make strategic
sense for a prosecutor to forgo examination, the government in such cases
lacks the motive necessary to meet “the express test and rationale of Rule
804(b)(1).”298 Under this reasoning, unless the government has actually
attacked exculpatory grand jury testimony, it would seem easy for a court to
hold that it lacked the motive to do so.299

293. See id. at 524.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 523–24.
296. See id. (“[I]t is arguable that the government had no meaningful opportunity to
discredit Femino at the time. In any case, it certainly lacked any evident motive to do so. If
the government had had Najarian’s cooperation in 1991, it could well have preferred to keep
it secret from Femino. The prosecutor might have wished to protect a key witness for the
time being or to bargain later with Femino, armed with a perjury charge against him. Given
the other evidence against the defendants, the government surely had no reason to fear that
Femino’s terse denials, if he were not directly confronted, would lead the grand jury to
refuse to indict.” (footnote omitted)).
297. Id. at 523; see also supra note 296.
298. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523–24 (“Often, the government neither aims to discredit the
witness [in the grand jury] nor to vouch for him. The prosecutor may want to secure a small
piece of evidence as part of an ongoing investigation or to compel an answer by an unwilling
witness or to “freeze” the position of an adverse witness. In particular, discrediting a grand
jury witness is rarely essential, because the government has a modest burden of proof, selects
its own witnesses, and can usually call more of them at its leisure.”); see also supra note
296.
299. This is because the government could always argue that it was not sufficiently
motivated to ask the questions that, under trial conditions, it would have asked; and, the
court has, by implication, credited this argument. See also United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d
909, 914 (2d Cir. 1993) (“In virtually all subsequent proceedings, examiners will be able to
suggest lines of questioning that were not pursued at a prior proceeding. In almost every
criminal case, the Government could probably point to some aspect of cross-examination . . .
that could have been employed . . . at a prior grand jury proceeding.”).
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B. The District of Columbia, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits’ Broad Admissibility
Decisions
In the three cases that follow, the courts admitted exculpatory grand jury
testimony against the government, reasoning, inter alia, that the prosecution
had an adequate motive and opportunity to develop the unavailable
witness’s testimony at the grand jury.300
1. The District of Columbia Circuit: United States v. Miller
In United States v. Miller,301 two defendants appealed their convictions
for charges related to wire fraud.302 They were in the business of providing
collateral, in the form of certificates of deposit issued by the Commercial
Bank of Djibouti, to entities seeking large commercial loans.303 The Bank,
however, was not properly registered under Djibouti’s laws.304 Part of the
government’s case depended on showing beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendants knew the certificates were worthless.305 To do this, the
prosecution emphasized, for instance, that certificates allegedly worth $17
million were found on the floor in an unlocked office owned by one of the
defendants.306 To refute such evidence, the defendants sought to call John
S. Matarazzo, who was present when the defendants met with a
representative of the Bank and supposedly received confirmation that the
certificates were legitimate.307 Matarazzo had testified before the grand
jury earlier as a defense witness but asserted his privilege against selfincrimination when called at trial.308 The defendants argued that Matarazzo
was precluded from asserting his privilege under the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit’s Ellis rule,309 and that his grand jury
testimony should be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1).310

300. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
301. 904 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
302. Id. at 65.
303. Id. at 66.
304. Id.
305. See id. at 68.
306. Id. at 66, 68.
307. Id. at 66.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 66–67; see also Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Under the Ellis rule, unique in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
at the time, a witness who knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights and testified in
front of the grand jury was not eligible to later invoke those rights and refuse to testify at
trial. Ellis, 416 F.2d at 800; see also Miller, 904 F.2d at 67. In Miller, the defendants argued
that if Matarazzo had in fact waived his privilege when testifying before the grand jury, then
it was error to allow him to refuse to testify at trial; or, in the alternative, if Matarazzo had
not waived his privilege before the grand jury, then it was error to refuse to admit his grand
jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). 904 F.2d at 66–67. The D.C. Circuit remanded to
determine whether Matarazzo had knowingly waived his rights but held that either way the
convictions were reversed. Id. at 67.
310. Id.
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With little discussion, the court held that, barring a determination that
Matarazzo was required to testify under the Ellis rule, his grand jury
testimony should have been admitted.311 The court concluded that the
prosecution had the same motive to question Matarazzo before the grand
jury as it did at trial.312 This is because, “[b]efore the grand jury and at
trial, Matarazzo’s testimony was to be directed to the same issue—the guilt
or innocence of [the defendants].”313
In discussing whether Matarazzo had knowingly waived his privilege
before the grand jury as part of its Ellis analysis, the court noted that the
government, which was the only party in a position to know what transpired
at the grand jury proceeding, behaved in a self-serving and “somewhat
disingenuous[]” manner in suggesting that Matarazzo had not waived his
privilege.314
The court also recognized that the prosecution’s
“contemptuous objection” to the defendant’s request to introduce
Matarazzo’s grand jury testimony was “promptly endorsed” by the trial
court.315 The court’s discussion on these points suggests that part of the
basis for its holding may have been to right a perceived unfairness
perpetrated against the defendants when the prosecution’s overzealous
behavior was endorsed by the trial court.316 But, the court’s primary reason
for its holding—that, after examining Matarazzo’s grand jury testimony, it
could “see no reason why the government’s position in the second
proceeding would differ from the first”—was based not on concern for
protecting the defendant, but on the fact that the prosecution had a
demonstrated motive at the grand jury proceeding to attack Matarazzo’s
testimony.317
2. The Sixth Circuit: United States v. Foster
In United States v. Foster,318 the defendant appealed from convictions
related to cocaine possession and intent to distribute.319 He was convicted
on evidence that was largely circumstantial320—namely, records seized
from his home indicating that he had made large cash purchases despite
lacking a substantial source of income, and his presence in the home of
311. Id.
312. Id. at 68.
313. Id.
314. See id. at 67 (“The government, somewhat disingenuously in its brief to this court,
claims the prosecutor ‘conceded’ before the district judge that Matarazzo had not waived his
privilege. (Since the government was attempting to prevent Matarazzo’s testimony at trial,
that is an interesting use of the word ‘conceded.’) In fact, the prosecutor, who presumably
was in a position to know what occurred, represented to the court below that ‘there was not a
waiver as such,’ whatever that means.”).
315. See id. at 68.
316. See id. at 67–68 (noting that the government’s only argument against the admission
of the grand jury testimony (which was endorsed by the trial court) was an overly formalistic
argument that the issue was not properly preserved for appeal).
317. See id. at 68 & n.3.
318. 128 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 1997).
319. Id. at 950.
320. Id. at 956.
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another suspected drug trafficker, Timothy Williams, when Williams’s
home was searched and large amounts of money and cocaine were found.321
Before the defendant, Charles H. Foster, was indicted, Williams testified
before a grand jury under a grant of immunity on three separate
occasions.322 Each time, Williams claimed that Foster had not been
involved in selling drugs and that Foster would not have been present in
Williams’s home had he known about Williams’s narcotics activities.323
Furthermore, “the government repeatedly made it clear to Williams that it
believed he was lying and that his testimony could subject him to perjury
charges.”324 After his indictment, Foster’s attorney requested a copy of
Williams’s grand jury testimony.325 The government did not provide it and
told Foster’s attorney only that Williams had “provided false exculpatory
testimony” about Foster.326
Approximately three weeks before Foster’s trial was to begin, the district
court requested copies of Williams’s grand jury testimony.327 After
guarding them for approximately two weeks, the court ordered the
government to release the transcripts to Foster’s attorney.328 As soon as he
received them, Foster’s attorney subpoenaed Williams and learned that an
Assistant U.S. Attorney allegedly told Williams he would revoke
Williams’s grant of immunity if Williams agreed to testify for Foster.329
Once the trial began, Foster’s attorney moved for a continuance, claiming
that he had not received Williams’s grand jury transcripts in time to
subpoena Williams.330 The district court determined, however, that
Foster’s attorney failed to exercise due diligence because he could have
attempted to subpoena Williams as soon as the government informed him
that Williams provided “false exculpatory testimony.”331 The district court
refused to admit the grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) because it
found that Williams was not “unavailable” where his absence was caused
by a lack of diligence in procuring him.332
On appeal, Foster’s attorney argued that the continuance should have
been granted because governmental misconduct prevented him from
subpoenaing Williams.333 He also argued that the grand jury testimony
should have been admitted under Rule 804(b)(1).334 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the government had not behaved

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 950–51.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 951.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 951–52.
Id. at 952.
Id. at 951–52, 955 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.
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improperly by failing to turn over the grand jury transcripts sooner,335 but
that its conduct in “warning” Williams’s attorney that Williams would be
subject to prosecution if he testified was possibly an attempt to intimidate
the witness.336 The court reasoned that the district court, however, had
waited too long to order the government to turn over the transcripts and that
Foster’s failure to subpoena Williams earlier was therefore not caused by a
lack of due diligence.337 The court also reasoned that the grand jury
testimony should have been admitted because the government was able to
“strenuously” question Williams before the grand jury, and “throughout
[Williams’s] testimony he continually asserted Foster’s innocence even
though he was repeatedly warned about the dangers of perjury and the risk
of losing his immunity.”338
The court noted that “the two factors which led the Second Circuit to
reject finding that the prosecutor had a similar motive in DiNapoli are not
present in this case”: (1) Foster was indicted after Williams was questioned
in the grand jury, and (2) there was no indication that the grand jurors as a
whole did not believe Williams’s testimony.339 Although the court may
seem to have applied a bright-line rule favoring the admissibility of
exculpatory grand jury testimony against the government,340 the court’s
method of analysis—comparing the circumstances of the grand jury
proceeding in this case with those present in DiNapoli—suggests that it
applied a presumption in favor of admissibility unless specific factors
indicate that the testimony should not be admissible.341 The circumstances
of this case favored such a holding: the facts indicated both the importance
of the witness’s testimony—because the indictment had not yet been
handed down—and the government’s “strenuous” opposition to that
testimony before the grand jury.342 These are the same characteristics that
would presumably govern the prosecution’s attitude toward the testimony at
trial.343 It is also noteworthy that the court expressed disdain for the
activities of the prosecution and the district court with respect to

335. Id. at n.2.
336. See id. at 954.
337. See id. at 955.
338. Id. & n.6.
339. See id. at 956 n.7; United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993); see
also supra note 253 and accompanying text.
340. See, for example, the court’s reading of the holding in Miller: “Three Circuits have
suggested and the District of Columbia Circuit has affirmatively ruled that the government
has the same motive to develop a witness’ testimony during a grand jury proceeding as it
does at trial.” Foster, 128 F.3d at 955 (citing United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 1990)).
341. Those specific factors are the ones present in DiNapoli: that the grand jurors
discredited the grand jury testimony, and that the defendant had already been indicted by the
time the exculpatory grand jury testimony was recorded. Id. at 956 n.7 (citing United States
v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993)).
342. See id. at 951, 955.
343. See, e.g., United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (comparing the
stakes of trial proceedings with those of grand jury proceedings); see also supra notes 288–
90 and accompanying text.
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withholding information from the defense.344 It suggests that part of the
reason for the court’s holding was to right a wrong that it believed had been
committed against the defendant.345
3. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. McFall
Monte D. McFall, a California lobbyist, appealed from convictions
related to extortion, honest services mail fraud, and witness tampering.346
One of the charges concerned an alleged scheme to extort money from a
company called Digital Angel that manufactured electronic tracking
devices.347 California’s Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP)
awarded a large grant to Digital Angel to fund a pilot project using its
tracking devices.348 McFall and Neat Allen Sawyer, Chief Deputy Director
of the OCJP, met with an official for the company and allegedly promised
that more money would be forthcoming if, and only if, Digital Angel paid a
$100,000 consulting fee to a company owned by McFall.349
Sawyer was eventually indicted and pled guilty to one count of honest
services mail fraud.350 As part of his plea agreement, he agreed to
cooperate with the government “with respect to its investigations and
prosecutions of public corruption in the Eastern District of California and
elsewhere.”351 Prior to his indictment, however, Sawyer appeared before a
grand jury and testified at length about the events involving Digital
Angel.352 He called the charge that he and McFall had attempted to extort
Digital Angel “ridiculous,” and he maintained the same version of the story
later in his post-plea debriefing.353
At McFall’s trial, the government declined to call Sawyer as a witness
despite its authority to do so pursuant to his plea agreement.354 When
McFall called him as a witness, Sawyer invoked his privilege against selfincrimination.355 Consequently, McFall sought to introduce Sawyer’s
grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).356 The district court excluded
the testimony, however, citing concerns about unfair prejudice to the
government and concluding that the prosecution lacked an adequate motive
to examine Sawyer before the grand jury.357 In support of its conclusion,
344. See Foster, 128 F.3d at 952 n.2.
345. But cf. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 326 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the “similar motive” analysis in a given case should not express a
policy favoring either the defendant or the government, but should “reflect[] narrow
concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence”).
346. United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).
347. Id. at 955.
348. Id.
349. See id. at 953, 955.
350. Id. at 954.
351. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
352. Id. at 960–61.
353. See id. at 961 (internal quotation marks omitted).
354. Id. at 964.
355. Id. at 961.
356. Id.
357. See id. at 960.
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the district court cited several key findings, among them the following: (1)
the grand jury proceeding was fact-finding in nature, not adversarial,
“notwithstanding the fact that the government’s attorneys did in fact
question Mr. Sawyer”; (2) “the motive for obtaining Mr. Sawyer’s
testimony . . . was completely different from what it would be” at trial; and
(3) Sawyer was the subject of a perjury indictment resulting from his
testimony before the grand jury.358 On appeal, the government argued,
inter alia, that Sawyer’s grand jury testimony should not have been
admitted because it was misleading.359
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
noting the circuit split concerning the appropriate “level of generality” at
which to compare grand jury and trial motive for purposes of Rule
804(b)(1).360 The Miller court used “a high level of generality,” where
motive to merely show the guilt or innocence of the defendant at both
proceedings would be sufficient.361 McFall argued that Sawyer’s testimony
should be admissible under the Miller test because “the government’s
primary goal in questioning Sawyer before the grand jury was to
incriminate McFall,” the “same” motive it would have at trial.362 The
DiNapoli court, in contrast, compared motives at “a fine-grained level of
particularity” and required “a substantially similar degree of interest in
prevailing” at both proceedings.363 The Ninth Circuit noted that the
prosecution’s motive in examining Sawyer before the grand jury was
“likely not as intense as it would have been at trial,” but that requiring an
“identical quantum of motivation” violates the plain language of Rule
804(b)(1).364 Because the prosecution’s “fundamental objective” in
examining Sawyer before the grand jury was to elicit testimony damaging
to McFall—the same motive that the prosecution would hypothetically have
at trial—the court concluded that Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test had
been met, and Sawyer’s testimony should have been admitted.365 The court
distinguished its facts from those in DiNapoli: Although McFall had
already been indicted, the final superseding indictment against him was not
obtained until after Sawyer was questioned, and, the nature of the relevant
charge against McFall—conspiracy to extort—provided prosecutors
questioning Sawyer with ample opportunity to develop testimony
incriminating McFall, despite the existing indictment.366

358. Id. at 961–62 (emphasis added).
359. See id. at 964 n.11.
360. Id. at 962.
361. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
362. Id.
363. Id. (quoting United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
364. Id. at 963 (“As one of the dissenters in DiNapoli . . . noted, the requirement of
similar ‘intensity’ of motivation conflicts with the rule’s plain language, which requires
‘similar’ but not identical motivation.” (citing United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 916 (2d
Cir. 1993) (Pratt, J., dissenting))); see also supra notes 255–60 and accompanying text.
365. McFall, 558 F.3d at 963.
366. Id.
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Finally, the court reasoned on policy grounds that Sawyer’s testimony
should have been admitted because, due to Sawyer’s plea agreement, he
was only “unavailable” to McFall.367 The government could have required
him to testify at any time.368 It also reasoned that the government’s motion
for a downward sentencing departure at Sawyer’s sentencing hearing,
implying its endorsement of Sawyer’s post-plea cooperation—including his
continued denial of McFall’s wrongdoing with respect to Digital Angel—
undercut the government’s contention that Sawyer’s grand jury testimony
was “unreliable and misleading.”369
The Ninth Circuit’s holding was based primarily on comparison of the
prosecution’s examination of Sawyer before the grand jury with the
examination it would hypothetically wish to conduct at trial.370 The court
eschewed DiNapoli’s “intensity” inquiry371 and rejected the district court’s
suggestion that the type of proceeding itself—fact-finding as opposed to
adversarial—precluded a finding of “similar motive” regardless of the
questioning that actually took place.372 The court’s discussion of possible
prosecutorial disingenuousness regarding the truthfulness of Sawyer’s
testimony, however, suggests that it may itself have judged whether Sawyer
was telling the truth and desired to check prosecutorial misconduct.373
III. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
The cases described above exemplify recent jurisprudence concerning the
admission of grand jury testimony against the government under Rule
804(b)(1). In these cases, courts reached their holdings after analyzing a
common set of recurring factors. Some of them are the same factors upon
which holdings pertaining to the admissibility of preliminary hearing
testimony against defendants, discussed in Part I.D.2.b.i, are based. For
both grand jury and preliminary hearing proceedings, specific
characteristics of the proceedings themselves deter attorneys from
examining witnesses in as complete a manner as they would at trial.374 Yet,
where grand jury examinations are concerned, courts have been willing to
respect that prosecutors’ strategic decisions to limit questioning should
count against a finding of “similar motive” and thus bar admission of grand
jury testimony.375 In contrast, courts have been less likely to view defense
attorneys’ similar choices to limit questioning as a bar to admitting
preliminary hearing testimony. This Note argues that the strategic factors—
which were illustrated in the principal cases above, and upon which the
difference in admissibility holdings between grand jury and preliminary

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 964.
Id.
Id. at n.11.
See id. at 963.
See id.
Id. at 961–62.
See id. at 964 n.11.
See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
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hearing testimony is based—should not be considered in the Rule 804(b)(1)
analysis. Likewise, neither generalized policy concerns nor favoritism for
the government or the defendant should affect the Rule 804(b)(1)
admissibility determination.
Part III.A discusses the holdings in the principle cases from Part II and
distills from them a set of factors that the courts considered in their
admissibility determinations. This Part analyzes the case holdings and the
decisive factors in light of the evidentiary purposes of Rule 804(b)(1) and
divides the factors into two categories—those which should legitimately be
considered in the “similar motive” analysis and those which should not.
Part III.B proposes an objective test for “similar motive” at the grand jury
that is designed to avoid the factors that are beyond the scope of Rule
804(b)(1).
A. Analysis of Circuit Court Decisions
In evidentiary terms, Rule 804(b)(1) balances the fairness of admitting
testimony against a party with the necessity of providing as much
information as possible to the fact-finder.376 Under the liberalized hearsay
rules embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the common law’s
formalistic tests for assuring that the opposing party conducted substantially
the same cross-examination at the prior proceeding that it would conduct at
trial have given way to more flexible admissibility requirements.377 Rather
than focus on “identity of parties” and “identity of issues,” the drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence centered the admissibility inquiry on the
interests of the parties involved, and hence on the “motive” for
examination.378 In this way, they broadened the meaning of fairness to
litigants379 and also satisfied necessity concerns by creating a test that
admits a potentially greater range of prior testimony hearsay than would
have been admissible at the common law.380 Nonetheless, the purpose of
the exception remains to admit prior testimony only when the opposing
party’s “opportunity” to examine the witness at the prior proceeding was
similar enough to the opportunity it would have at trial to merit holding the
party to the prior testimony.381 The rule’s “opportunity” element thus
guards against parties being able to determine what testimony may later be
admitted against them by strategically limiting prior proceeding
questioning.382 Given these considerations, it is clear that no bright-line
test could ever be applied to admit or exclude all grand jury or preliminary
hearing testimony.383 It is also clear that both the narrow and broad
376. See supra Part I.C.1.
377. See supra Part I.C.2–3.
378. See supra Part I.C.3.b.
379. The drafters did this by supplanting the common law test—under which similarity of
issues and privity relationships stood in as proxies for the interests of parties—with a test
that inquires into the parties’ interests or motivations themselves. See supra Part I.C.
380. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.C.2–3.
381. See supra Part I.D.2.a.
382. See supra Part I.D.2.a.
383. See supra text accompanying note 228.
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interpretations of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” requirement, discussed
in Part II, fall short of fulfilling the evidentiary purposes of the exception.
1. The Narrow Admissibility Decisions
Although they do not adhere to a bright-line rule, the Second and First
Circuits utilize a test under which exculpatory grand jury testimony would
almost never be admissible against the government.384 The Second
Circuit’s test considers “whether the party resisting the offered testimony at
a pending proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of substantially
similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a substantially
similar issue.”385 The First Circuit, in comparison, expresses concern that
the very nature of grand jury proceedings provides little incentive for the
government to examine exculpatory witnesses with a motive “similar” to
that which would be present under trial conditions; therefore, grand jury
testimony can almost never satisfy “the express test and rationale of Rule
804(b)(1).”386 Both of these positions bear an essential flaw.
By requiring the opposing party to show an interest of comparable
“intensity” to disprove the witness’s testimony at the prior proceeding, the
Second Circuit’s test adds a stringency that Rule 804(b)(1)’s plain language
does not support.387 As Justice Blackmun argued in his United States v.
Salerno concurrence, “‘similar motive’ does not mean ‘identical
motive.’”388 By looking for a quantum of motivation that substantially
matches the quantum present at trial, the Second Circuit effectively
collapses Rule 804(b)(1)’s test into one that looks for the same motivation.
The government could always argue that, given whatever circumstances
prevailed at a particular grand jury proceeding, its motive to examine the
witness was not as intense as its motive at trial.389 From a pure policy
perspective, this argument might be difficult to refute because witnesses are
examined in front of grand juries under a wide array of circumstances,
many of which provide little incentive for aggressive challenges to
exculpatory testimony.390 Under the evidentiary rule as it stands, however,
the test requires “similar,” not the “same,” motivation.391 To read the rule
looking for the same quantum of motivation at both proceedings harks back
to the common law’s excessively formalistic requirements that ensured the
strictest fairness to the opposing party, but at the expense of necessity to
fact-finders.392 Such a reading of the rule ignores the liberalizing tendency
384. See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra Part II.A.
385. See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15; see also supra Part II.A.1.d.
386. See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523; see also supra note 298 and accompanying text.
387. See, e.g., United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (reasoning, in
criticism of the DiNapoli opinion, that “Rule 804(b)(1) does not require an identical quantum
of motivation”).
388. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 326 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
389. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
390. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
391. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); see also supra text accompanying note 228.
392. See supra Part I.C.2.
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence.393 Furthermore, with respect to grand
jury testimony, the “same motive” test is one that could likely only be met
where the indictment was in doubt such that the prosecution felt compelled
to actively discredit, rather than sidestep, unexpected exculpatory
statements.394 Because this is not often the case, requiring the prosecution
to have had the “same motive” would almost always result in exculpatory
testimony developed before the grand jury being inadmissible at trial.
The decision in United States v. Omar395 provides a rich context for
discussing how strategic concerns bear on “motive.” In this case, the First
Circuit ruled against admission of exculpatory grand jury testimony on
generalized reasoning that the grand jury proceeding itself does not create a
motive sufficient for prosecutors to examine exculpatory witnesses.396 This
reasoning ignores that Rule 804(b)(1) was designed to admit prior
testimony that meets certain guarantees of fairness and reliability without
regard for the type of proceeding at which the declarant testified.397 The
internal logic of the rule suggests that the admissibility inquiry in a given
case should focus on whether the prior testimony has met the “similar
motive” standard of the rule, not on the pressures common to proceedings
of a certain type. By allowing the “similar motive” inquiry to be colored by
the strategic choices that prosecutors commonly make at grand jury
proceedings, the court ensured strict fairness to the prosecution, but it failed
to account for the “necessity” concerns that Rule 804(b)(1) also
embodies.398 In other words, the court’s reasoning that prosecutors
conducting grand jury examinations ordinarily do not have the motive
necessary to meet “the express test and rationale of Rule 804(b)(1)”399
ignores that Rule 804(b)(1) requires “similar”—not “same”—motive,400
and that in doing so the rule satisfies the “necessity” concern as well as the
“fairness” concern.
The First Circuit also ignored a fundamental principle of the prior
testimony admissibility inquiry:
a party’s strategic choices during
questioning should not influence the court’s admissibility determination
where a meaningful opportunity to develop the testimony was otherwise
present.401 In effect, the court reasoned that because it makes sense,
strategically, for prosecutors to forgo lines of questioning at grand jury
proceedings to preserve the secrecy of information, prosecutors will rarely
have a motive to attack witness testimony at the grand jury that is “similar”
to the motive they would have at trial, where they have no secrets to
preserve.402 This may be true—and, as a result, it might make sense from a
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

See supra Part I.C.3.
Cf. text accompanying note 290.
104 F.3d 519 (1st Cir. 1997).
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.1.
Omar, 104 F.3d at 523.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.2.a; see also supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523.
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policy perspective to exclude all exculpatory grand jury testimony offered
against the government.403 But, in evidentiary terms, the rule is not
concerned with generalized policy considerations beyond balancing fairness
to litigants with the necessity of information for fact-finders.404 Also, the
rule’s “opportunity” test stands as a reminder that attorneys examining
witnesses should not be able to control, through their strategic decisions, the
later admissibility of statements under the hearsay exception for prior
testimony if the witness becomes unavailable.405
Neither the common law hearsay exception for prior testimony nor the
Federal Rule as enacted by Congress emphasized the type of proceeding at
which the declarant testified.406 As the exception developed, it was
liberalized to admit more evidence at trial, as long as that evidence met the
rule’s standard of reliability based on the opportunity for examination.407
The inherent power that the prosecution has in conducting grand jury
investigations408 means that when applying Rule 804(b)(1) to grand jury
testimony offered against the government, courts must be especially
vigilant to prevent prosecutorial control of the proceeding from influencing
the later admissibility of the testimony. Just because a prosecutor
conducting a grand jury investigation might have the luxury of not
challenging exculpatory testimony does not mean there was no “motive” to
do so.409 By taking strategy into account when determining whether a
prosecutor had adequate motive to examine a grand jury witness, the
Second and First Circuits have allowed the “similar motive” analysis to
stray from the narrow evidentiary purposes of the rule and have instituted a
policy favoring the government’s interests with respect to exculpatory
grand jury testimony.
2. The Broad Admissibility Decisions
Unlike the Second and First Circuits, the District of Columbia, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have created a presumption of admissibility against the
government for exculpatory grand jury testimony based on the fact that at
both proceedings the government is adverse to any testimony exculpating
the subject of its grand jury investigation.410 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
which had the benefit of comparing their cases with United States v.
DiNapoli,411 each noted that the particular facts upon which the DiNapoli

403. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i. Compare supra text accompanying note 233 with supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
404. See supra Part I.C.1; see also supra note 225 and accompanying text.
405. See supra Part I.D.2.a.
406. See supra notes 82–84, 109 and accompanying text.
407. See supra Part I.C.2–3.
408. See supra notes 157–65, 218 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
410. See United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
411. 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
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court relied were not present in their cases.412 Specifically, the final
indictment had not yet been handed down at the time of questioning, and
the grand jurors had not taken the unusual step of informing the prosecution
that they did not believe the witnesses’ exculpatory testimony.413 The
comparison with DiNapoli’s facts suggests that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
employed a presumption of admissibility based upon prosecutorial
adversity (from Miller414) that could be overcome in circumstances such as
those present in DiNapoli. In other words, these courts employed a test
where grand jury testimony is presumed to be admissible against the
government unless rather rare circumstances prevailed at the grand jury.
This rule is inadequate because it does not place enough emphasis on
whether the prosecution actually had a “similar motive,” in evidentiary
terms, to examine the testimony of a grand jury witness. Instead, it focuses
only on whether the prosecution would have been adverse to the witness’s
testimony at the time it was delivered.415 Admitting grand jury testimony
against the government under such a loose standard might go a long way
toward countering the prosecution’s inherently greater power with respect
to developing evidence in the grand jury;416 but, as the Supreme Court has
held, an interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) that bypasses its evidentiary
requirements in the interest of evening the odds for the defense violates the
fundamental character of the Federal Rules of Evidence.417 Subscribing to
the factual inquiry that the rule calls for, one must concede that, strategic
concerns aside, there will be times when the prosecution does not have an
adequate motive to develop some aspect of a grand jury witness’s
exculpatory testimony, even though the prosecution might meet a minimal
standard of adversity at the time of the questioning. So, a line of holdings
that presumes exculpatory grand jury testimony is admissible against the
government except under rather rare circumstances, such as those in
DiNapoli, violates the scheme for admissibility set out in the Federal Rules
of Evidence.418
3. Analysis of Deciding Factors
The case holdings discussed above, along with the decisions admitting
preliminary hearing testimony against defendants discussed generally in
Part I.D.2.b.i, were based on courts’ analyses of a set of factors which
appeared in some or all of the cases and dissenting opinions. They are as
follows:
412. See McFall, 558 F.3d at 963; Foster, 128 F.3d at 956 n.7.
413. Cf. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915.
414. See Miller, 904 F.2d at 68; see also supra text accompanying notes 311–13.
415. See, e.g., McFall, 558 F.3d at 962–63 (“The Miller Court concluded that ‘[b]efore
the grand jury and at trial’ the testimony of an unavailable co-conspirator ‘was to be directed
to the same issue—the guilt or innocence’ of the defendants, and thus, the government’s
motives were sufficiently similar. . . . On balance, we agree with the D.C. Circuit’s
elaboration of the ‘similar motive’ test . . . .”).
416. See supra notes 157–65, 218 and accompanying text.
417. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
418. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
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1. Whether, with regard to the specific issue for which the testimony was
offered at trial, the prosecution or defense had enough information at
the time the witness was questioned to challenge the testimony.419
2. Whether the examination conducted by the prosecution or defense
revealed a motive to challenge the testimony, even if the challenge
was not as aggressive or as complete as it would have been at trial.420
3. Whether the prosecution or defense limited questioning on a specific
issue to maintain the secrecy of information.421
4. Whether the characteristics inherent in the proceeding at which the
declarant testified—such as the low probable cause burden or the nonadversarial nature of the proceeding—acted to limit the questioning of
witnesses.422
5. Whether, in a grand jury proceeding, the indictment was secure, or
whether, in a preliminary hearing proceeding, the defense had a
reasonable chance of overcoming the prosecution’s burden of
probable cause.423
6. Whether the government, the defendant, or the lower court behaved
disingenuously or overzealously, and whether admitting or excluding
prior testimony would seem to redress the behavior.424
7. Whether the declarant was only “unavailable” to the defendant, such
that admitting the prior testimony would not prejudice the
government.425
8. Whether recognizing the government’s inherently more powerful
position with respect to obtaining evidence in the grand jury
encourages a policy of admitting grand jury testimony against the
government.426
419. See United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 326–32 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
McFall, 558 F.3d at 963; Miller, 904 F.2d at 68 & n.3; see also supra notes 230–32, 312–13,
317, 365 and accompanying text.
420. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 326–32 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McFall, 558 F.3d
at 963; United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Foster,
128 F.3d 949, 955 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1997); Salerno II, 974 F.2d 231, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1992),
vacated en banc sub nom. United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993); Miller, 904
F.2d at 68 & n.3; see also supra notes 230–32, 237, 292, 297, 312–13, 317, 338, 364–65,
370 and accompanying text.
421. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 329–30 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Omar, 104 F.3d at 523–
24; United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 233–34,
254, 295–96 and accompanying text.
422. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 325–26 (Blackmun, J., concurring); McFall, 558 F.3d at
961–62; Omar, 104 F.3d at 523–24; DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912–15; Salerno I, 937 F.2d 797,
806 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); see also supra notes 211–12, 227–28, 247–
51, 287–90, 298, 358 and accompanying text.
423. See McFall, 558 F.3d at 963; Omar, 104 F.3d at 524; Foster, 128 F.3d at 956 n.7;
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915; see also supra notes 253, 293–94, 339, 366 and accompanying text.
424. See Foster, 128 F.3d at 952 & n.2, 954–55; Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 807; Miller, 904
F.2d at 67–68; see also supra notes 221–22, 314–16, 335–37, 344–45 and accompanying
text.
425. See McFall, 558 F.3d at 964; Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806–07; see also supra notes
215–17, 367–68 and accompanying text.
426. See Salerno, 505 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806–
07; see also supra notes 215–20, 229 and accompanying text.
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9. Whether the court believed the prior testimony was truthful.427
These factors may be divided into two categories, those that may
legitimately be considered as part of the “similar motive” analysis given the
history and evidentiary purposes of Rule 804(b)(1), and those that are
beyond the scope of the rule and should not affect admissibility decisions.
Of the factors listed, only the first two are a legitimate subject of the
“similar motive” inquiry. They alone adhere to the evidentiary purposes of
Rule 804(b)(1) and bear on “motive” to examine at a prior proceeding
without introducing strategy, policy, favoritism, or impermissible judicial
discretion into the analysis. Factors (3)–(5) are each relevant to a
discussion of whether the prosecution, before the grand jury, or the defense,
in the preliminary hearing, would have felt an incentive to examine its
witness with the same “intensity” as it might at trial. But these factors are
not relevant to whether the bare “motive” to examine, for purposes of the
hearsay exception, existed.428 Factors (6)–(8) concern issues of policy
which are beyond the narrow evidentiary scope of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in general, and Rule 804(b)(1) in particular. Finally, factor (9),
which concerns whether the court believes that the prior testimony should
be admitted or excluded on the basis of its perceived truthfulness,429
violates the intent of the advisory committee that judicial discretion should
not play a role in the hearsay admissibility analysis.430
B. Proposed Resolution
As courts and commentators have noted, neither the Federal Rules
themselves nor the Supreme Court’s opinions definitively state what kind of
test courts should use in determining whether a “similar motive” exists for
purposes of Rule 804(b)(1).431 The Rules’ drafters purposely avoided
boxing courts into a rigid inquiry that might detract from a case-by-case
analysis.432 The fact that courts have employed differing admissibility
standards for grand jury testimony offered against the government suggests,
however, that a uniform “similar motive” test for grand jury testimony
might be needed. This test should avoid anything approaching a bright-line
rule, and it should prevent strategic use of questioning, policy
considerations, favoritism, or judicial discretion from influencing the
admissibility determination.
On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Salerno, the Second Circuit panel employed a two-step “reasonable
examiner” test that suggests a solution.433 Because the admissibility
427. See McFall, 558 F.3d at 961–62, 964 n.11; DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916 (Pratt, J.,
dissenting); Salerno I, 937 F.2d at 806; see also supra notes 210, 212, 258–59, 358, 369, 373
and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
429. See, e.g., supra notes 203, 210, 212 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
431. See supra Parts I.D.2.b, II.A.1.b.
432. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
433. See supra Part II.A.1.c.
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inquiry for prior testimony concerns whether it is fair to hold a party to
testimony that was developed in a previous proceeding, and it is only fair to
do so when the opposing party had an adequate opportunity to develop the
testimony by examination or cross-examination,434 the first step in the
admissibility inquiry should be for the court to look at the examination that
the prosecution actually conducted before the grand jury.435 If the
prosecution conducted even a limited examination designed to discredit the
exculpatory testimony with regard to the issues now relevant at trial, it
should be very difficult for the government to argue that it lacked a motive
to do so.436
It is not enough, however, to stop with an inquiry into the extent of
examination that the prosecution actually conducted.437 Rule 804(b)(1)
admits testimony where the opportunity and motive to develop it existed,
not merely where an actual examination or cross-examination took place.438
This aspect of admissibility assures that strategic considerations, which
might counsel an attorney against conducting as thorough an examination at
the prior proceeding as he or she would conduct at trial, do not influence the
later admissibility of the evidence.439 Therefore, where the initial inquiry
into the questioning that was actually conducted before the grand jury
reveals that something short of sufficient examination on the material issues
occurred, the second step is for the court to determine whether a “similar
motive” would have existed for examination, despite the lack of actual
questioning on the material issues.440
This is a difficult inquiry that goes to the heart of what it means for the
prosecution to have a “similar motive” at the grand jury proceeding. As
Professor Michael Martin has explained, referring to the substantially
similar admissibility test promulgated by the Supreme Court in its initial
version of Rule 804(b)(1),441
[T]he objective of the motive and interest test is to determine whether
there is any significant reason why facts relevant to the present inquiry . . .
would not have been elicited at the prior hearing. A “significant reason”
for these purposes would be one which would affect the conduct of the
examination by a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances. It is
unfair to hold a party to the former examination if no reasonable attorney
would be expected to have elicited the now-relevant facts; but if the
circumstances were such that those facts could have been brought out if
they were available, the present opponent can fairly be held.442

With respect to grand jury testimony, strategic use of questioning is one
of the primary reasons why reasonable prosecutors do not elicit facts. This
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.1.c.
See supra Parts I.D.2.a, I.D.2.b.ii; see also cases cited supra note 420.
See supra Part I.D.2.a.
See supra Part I.D.2.a.
See supra Part I.D.2.a.
See supra Part II.A.1.c.
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
Martin, supra note 4, at 558–59.
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Note argues, however, that strategic considerations are not “significant”
within the evidentiary scope of Rule 804(b)(1); hence, the “reasonable
attorney” test should not consider a prosecutor’s motive for examination at
the grand jury to be diminished when questioning was limited because of
prosecutorial strategy. A refinement of the reasonable attorney test is
needed that can determine whether a motive existed to elicit now-relevant
facts, but that avoids taking into consideration such things as strategic
limitation of questioning, policies favoring either the prosecution or the
defense, or judicial determinations concerning the merit of prior testimony.
In his Second Circuit panel opinion on remand from the Supreme Court
in United States v. Salerno, Judge Pratt reasoned that, if the inquiry into
whether the prosecution actually conducted a similarly motivated grand jury
examination on the material issues is inconclusive, then the second step is
for the court to objectively determine “whether a reasonable examiner under
the circumstances would have had a similar motive to examine the
witness.”443 The purpose of this inquiry is to ensure “that the failure to
vigorously examine the witness—for tactical reasons or otherwise—does
not insulate the prior testimony from admission.”444 So, in the test put
forward by the Second Circuit panel, the reasonableness determination, at
least in the abstract,445 does not consider the strategic choices that actual
prosecutors are likely to make. The “similar motive” test for grand jury
testimony offered against the government could thus be restated as follows:
Considering the scope of the investigation and the information available to
the prosecution at the time of questioning, the court should determine
whether a reasonable prosecutor would have had a motive to challenge the
testimony with respect to the issues now relevant at trial, regardless of
whether any such challenge was forgone for strategic reasons or otherwise.
Alternatively, the test could be stated: Considering the scope of the
investigation and the information available to the prosecution at the time of
questioning, the court should determine whether a reasonable prosecutor,
proceeding as if the witness were testifying at trial, would have had a
motive to discredit the exculpatory testimony.
Professor Glen Weissenberger has noted that “[t]he critical issue raised
by Rule 804(b)(1) is whether to admit the evidence or completely sacrifice
the testimony of the [declarant]; consequently, only genuinely dissimilar
motives should result in exclusion.”446 This understanding of Rule
804(b)(1) highlights the fact that the rule’s evidentiary function is to
provide needed information to fact-finders, and not merely to ensure strict
fairness to litigants.447 In many grand jury situations, a prosecutor’s motive
to develop exculpatory testimony, although not as “intense” as it might be
443. Salerno II, 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated en banc sub nom. United
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra Part II.A.1.c.
444. Salerno II, 974 F.2d at 239; see also supra Part II.A.1.c.
445. The court did not clearly apply the test to its facts. See supra note 243 and
accompanying text.
446. Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1102.
447. See supra Part I.C.1.
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at trial, would nonetheless not be “genuinely dissimilar” from the motive
the prosecution would have at trial.448 Rather, it is simply that a low burden
and the nature of prosecutorial power in the grand jury leave the
prosecution with no urgent need to exercise its “motive.”449 If strategic
considerations brought on by grand jury conditions were eliminated from
the “similar motive” test, Rule 804(b)(1)’s evidentiary purpose could be
better served by providing more information to the fact-finder without
sacrificing essential fairness to the government. After all, “[w]here [a]
party forgoes cross-examination, it is not unfair to make him or her suffer
the consequences.”450 Furthermore, where the prosecution has obtained
grand jury testimony by granting immunity to the witness, it is foreseeable
that the witness might become “unavailable” at trial if immunity is not
extended, and, consequently, the grand jury testimony might be admissible
pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1). In the parallel situation concerning preliminary
hearing testimony, it has been suggested that the defense might have a
“motive” to cross-examine a preliminary hearing witness simply because it
is aware that the testimony might become admissible if the witness is
“unavailable” at trial.451 If that is so, might not the prosecution have a
“motive” to examine an exculpatory grand jury witness to whom the
government has granted immunity simply because it understands that the
witness is likely to become “unavailable” if immunity is not extended to the
trial?452
As it generally stands, there is a discontinuity between admissibility
determinations for preliminary hearing and grand jury testimony under Rule
804(b)(1).453 The “reasonable examiner” test above, which does not take
into account the strategic decisions of examiners, seems already to be
applied by courts to preliminary hearing testimony that is offered against
the defendant.454 But, in situations where exculpatory grand jury testimony
is offered against the government, courts have allowed prosecutors’
strategic choices to influence the admissibility determination, and some
have even favored the government by holding that the nature of grand jury
proceedings themselves precludes finding prosecutorial motive for
examination.455 In both grand jury and preliminary hearing situations,
similar forces influence the extent to which an examiner is likely to
question a witness.456 Before the grand jury, the government’s burden is
448. See, e.g., United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (arguing that,
although the prosecution may not have had “an identical quantum of motivation” to examine
the exculpatory witness before the grand jury, the district court nonetheless “erred in
concluding that the government’s respective motives were ‘completely different’” at the
grand jury and at trial).
449. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i; see also supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
450. Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 1097; see also supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
451. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 129–30. But see supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
453. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
454. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
455. See supra Parts I.D.2.b.i, II.A.
456. See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
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low and it is often in the prosecution’s interest not to reveal all that it might
know about an investigation—not to “tip its hand”—by thoroughly
questioning an exculpatory witness when its burden has been met.457
Similarly, the prosecution must meet a low burden at preliminary hearings
in criminal cases, so it is often not in the defense’s interest to discredit the
prosecution’s inculpatory evidence using means as aggressive as it would at
trial, where the prosecution’s higher burden favors the defense.458 Yet,
despite the similarities between the factors influencing “motive” at these
two proceedings, courts have treated them differently.459
Convincing policy arguments might be made for employing Rule
804(b)(1)’s “similar motive” test in such a way as to either support the
activities of law enforcement or protect the interests of defendants. For
instance, some argue that liberally admitting grand jury testimony against
the government would encourage prosecutors to expand the scope of grand
jury proceedings and treat them, at least as far as witness examination is
concerned, more like trials. This in turn would increase the burden on the
government with respect to conducting grand jury investigations and would
decrease the overall effectiveness of law enforcement.460 It has also been
argued that admitting grand jury testimony against the government when
the witness is only realistically “unavailable” to the defense is a necessary
measure to counterbalance the prosecution’s greater power with respect to
Such generalized policy
obtaining evidence in the grand jury.461
considerations, along with the strategic considerations discussed above, are
beyond the evidentiary scope of Rule 804(b)(1), however, and should not be
considered in the prior testimony admissibility analysis.462 If the
reasonable examiner test that the Second Circuit panel described were
applied to both grand jury and preliminary hearing testimony as the sole
means by which prior testimony could be admitted, it would ensure that the
evidentiary purpose behind Rule 804(b)(1) was met in each instance. It
would prevent courts from basing admissibility decisions on before-the-fact
determinations of the truthfulness or accuracy of the testimony. It would
prevent courts that identify with the interests of either the government or
the defense from favoring one or the other in admissibility determinations.
It would screen “intensity” of motive from the “similar motive” inquiry and
place the focus instead on a party’s reasonable opportunity to develop facts
at the prior proceeding. Finally, it would prevent courts from considering
questioners’ strategic decisions in the admissibility determination. The
“reasonable examiner” test would direct courts instead to consider the
circumstances that prevailed at grand jury and preliminary hearing
proceedings—to consider what the attorneys knew at the time they
questioned their witnesses, and whether they possessed sufficient
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 425; see also supra Part I.D.2.b.i.
See supra Part II.A.1.b.
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information to recognize the witnesses’ testimony as adverse and therefore
discredit it.
CONCLUSION
U.S. Courts of Appeals applying Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)’s
“similar motive” test to grand jury testimony offered against the
government have based their admissibility determinations on different
factors common to grand jury examinations. As a result, a split has
developed between those circuit courts that have narrowly construed the
requirement and would rarely encounter circumstances that could satisfy
their stringent admissibility test, and those circuits that have taken a more
expansive view of prosecutorial motive and would presumptively admit
grand jury testimony against the government in most cases. The primary
factor resulting in the split is whether the court would consider a
prosecutor’s strategic use of limited questioning at the grand jury to bear
upon the prosecution’s “motive” for examination in the abstract. Neither
the narrow test, which considers such strategic use of questioning, nor the
broad test, which dismisses it, is true to the evidentiary purposes of Rule
804(b)(1). The admissibility inquiry is further complicated by a seemingly
contradictory interpretation of the “similar motive” test with respect to
preliminary hearing testimony offered against defendants. In those cases,
under circumstances analogous to those present in the grand jury setting,
courts usually have held preliminary hearing testimony admissible. If the
“reasonable examiner” test described by the Second Circuit panel on
remand from the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno were adopted
with the explicit provision that strategic decisions to limit questioning in
both the grand jury and preliminary hearing contexts should not influence
courts’ “similar motive” determinations, several benefits would ensue.
Courts would have a more uniform and predictable standard for
determining the admissibility of grand jury testimony against the
government; and, the standard for grand jury testimony would parallel that
already employed for preliminary hearing testimony, where defendants’ low
motive to challenge witnesses due to the proceeding’s low burden of proof
does not bar admission of the testimony. Also, application of a uniform
“similar motive” test would allow prosecutors to more accurately predict
when exculpatory testimony uncovered in the grand jury might later
resurface at trial pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1). Finally, applying the
“reasonable examiner” test to grand jury testimony offered pursuant to Rule
804(b)(1) would ensure that courts do not resort to impermissible discretion
based upon the perceived merit of the contested testimony, and that they
remain within the evidentiary confines of the rule and do not consider such
extrinsic factors as adversarial fairness in the abstract or policy favoring
either the government or the defense.

